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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the instant
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h)

(2002).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether

the trial

court

soundly exercised

its broad

discretion by issuing an equitable order for increased alimony upon
the termination of child support.

The appellate court reviews a
Bakanowski

trial court's award of alimony for abuse of discretion.
v.

Bakanowski,

Willey,

2003 UT App 357, %7, 80 P.3d 153 (citing Willey

951 P.3d 226, 230 (Utah 1997)); Woodward

P.2d 393, 394 (Utah 1985); Hill

v.

Hill,

v.

Woodward,

v.
709

968 P.2d 866, 869 (Utah

Ct. App. 1998) . An award of alimony will not be disturbed "so long
as the trial court exercises its discretion within the standards
set by the appellate courts."

Id.

(quoting Haumont

v. Haumont,

793

P.2d 421, 423 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)).
The trial court's findings of fact underlying an award of
alimony

are

overturned

only

if

they

are

clearly

erroneous.

See Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) . To establish clear error, the appellant
" x must marshal [] the evidence in support of the findings and then
demonstrate that despite this evidence, the court's findings are so
lacking

in support

evidence.'"

as to be against

In re E.D.,

the clear weight

of the

876 P.2d 397, 402 (Utah Ct. App.), cert.

1

denied,

890 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1994) (quoting In re

1122, 1124 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)).

J.D.M. , 808 P.2d

When the appellant fails to meet

the "'heavy burden7" of marshaling the evidence, see
City,

818 P.2d at 1315

"'assumes

that

court/"

Wade v. Stangl,

(quoting Saunders
2.

the

supports
869 P.2d

Sharp,

the

findings

9, 12

of

the

trial

(Utah Ct'. App. 1994)

806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991)).

Whether the trial court exercised sound discretion in the

course

of

equitably

awarding

retroactive

court's award of alimony is reviewed
Bakanowski
Willey

Valley

(citation omitted), the appellate court

record

v.

West

v. Bakanowski,

v. Willey,

Woodward,

alimony.

The

trial

for abuse of discretion.

2003 UT App 357, %7, 80 P. 3d 153 (citing

951 P.3d

226, 230

(Utah 1997));

709 P.2d 393, 394 (Utah 1985); Hill

866, 869 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).

v. Hill,

Woodward

v.

968 P.2d

A trial court's award of alimony

will not be disturbed "so long as the trial court exercises its
discretion within the standards set by the appellate courts."
(quoting Haumont

v. Haumont,

793 P. 2d 421, 423

Id.

(Utah Ct. App.

1990)).

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules,
and regulations, whose interpretation is determinative, are set out

2

verbatim, with the appropriate citation, in the body and arguments
of the instant Brief of Appellee.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves the appeal of Mr. Richardson from specific
provisions in the Decree of Divorce dealing with the trial court's
award of alimony.

After a lengthy marriage, which resulted in a

total of six children, four of which were minors at the time of
trial, the parties separated in January 2003.

Approximately seven

months later, Petitioner, Kynda Kay Richardson, filed a Petition
for

Divorce,

to

which

Respondent,

Kenneth

Andrew

Richardson,

responded.
The parties subsequently appeared before the district court
for a bench trial, after which the trial court took the case under
advisement.

Almost four months later, the trial court issued a

Memorandum Decision.
Mr.

Richardson

Reconsideration
responded.
another

of

Almost

Memorandum

filed
Court's

a

Motion

Ruling,

five months

3

which

later, the

Decision, granting

denying it in part.

to

and

Memorandum
Ms.

trial

the Motion

for

Richardson

court

issued

in part

and

Thereafter, the trial court issued its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and the Decree of Divorce.

Mr. Richardson

appealed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts are to be drawn in a light most favorable to the
trial court's findings of fact and the evidence presented at trial.
Cf.

Tucker

v.

Tucker,

conjunction with

910 P. 2d 1209, 1215 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).

that

directive, Ms. Richardson,

In

as Appellee,

provides the following Statement of Facts:
1.

The parties separated in January 2003 (R. 304:6:4-5);

2.

On

August

26,

2003,

Kynda

Kay

Richardson,

filed

a

Petition for Divorce, seeking, among other things, child support
and alimony consistent with established legal principles (R. 1-8);
3.

Kenneth Andrew Richardson, responded by way of Amended

Answer (R. 12-17);
4.

The parties appeared before the district court for a

bench trial on February 8, 2005 (R. 44);
5.

At the time of trial, the parties had been married for

approximately twenty-five years (R. 304:6:4-5);
6.

The parties had a total of six children over the course

of the marriage, the following four of which were minors at the
time of trial:

Dana May Richardson

4

(DOB:

May 17, 1987); Kyle

Allen Richardson (DOB:

July 19, 1988); Avery Keen Richardson (DOB:

August 21, 1990); and Justin Wallace Richardson (DOB:

March 25,

1993) (R. 2; R. 304:7-8; R. 47);
7.

During trial, both Petitioner and Respondent provided

detailed testimony over the course of almost four hours (R. 304:5150) ;
8.

Ms. Richardson testified, among other things, that the

parties' two oldest children attended college while living with the
Richardsons, and that they continued to financially support them
during that time (R. 304:31:3-11);
9.

After entertaining closing arguments from counsel, the

trial court took the case under advisement (R. 304:151-93);
10.
court

Almost four months later, on June 2, 2 005, the trial

issued a fourteen-page Memorandum Decision, analyzing in

detail the issues presented by the parties at trial

(R. 46-60).

See R. 46-60, Memorandum Decision, a true and correct copy of which
is attached hereto as Addendum A;
11.

The trial court awarded Ms. Richardson, as the primary

caretaker of the children, sole physical and legal custody of the
parties' minor children (R. 47) ;
12.

In its Memorandum Decision, the trial court considered at

length the underlying factors relating to an award of alimony (R.
52-58),

determining

that

a payment
5

of

$420 per month

to Ms.

Richardson to be a "fair and reasonable award." (R. 57) . The trial
court concluded that alimony should be paid for a period equal to
the length of the marriage, which was approximately twenty-five
(Id.);

years
13.

In conjunction with the alimony award, the trial court

found that "a good part of the income needed by Ms. Richardson to
maintain the appropriate standard of living is also attributable to
(Id.).

child support payments" from Mr. Richardson

The court

determined that as the parties' children reach the age of eighteen,
over the next few years, Ms. Richardson's "income will be reduced
disproportionately to the reduction of expenses both because the
reasonable expenses associated for a time even with older children
will not necessarily diminish to zero as they reach 18 years old"
and,

additionally,

utilities

and

"because

so on will

some

not

expenses,

necessarily

such
be

as

mortgage,

significantly

or

proportionately reduced even when children do leave the home."
(Id.);

14.

Based on this, the trial court concluded

"that it is

reasonable to increase alimony to some extent as [Ms. Richardson's]
income

from

child

support

payments

goes

down

and

as

Richardson's] expenses from such payments also diminish."

[Mr.
(Id.).

According to the trial court, "[t]his also contributes to the goal

6

of maintaining a rough equivalence in the parties' standard of
living after this long-term marriage."
15.

(Id.);

To implement to the foregoing, the trial court determined

that the "alimony payments due to [Ms. Richardson] should therefore
increase by $100 per month, beginning the first day of the month
after which each child turns eighteen" so that "when the last child
turns eighteen, [Mr. Richardson's] income will have increased by
about $1,375 per month, while commensurate alimony increases to
[Ms. Richardson]

will

amount

to $400 per month,

leaving

[Mr.

Richardson] with some cushion that takes into account the purported
increased cost of living in Alaska and not reducing his standard of
(Id.);

living below [Ms. Richardson]."
16.

Finally, the trial court concluded that alimony should be

paid retroactive to the time of separation (R. 58);
17.

On July

7, 2005, Mr. Richardson

filed

a Motion and

Memorandum for Reconsideration of Court's Ruling, asking that the
trial court reconsider its findings and conclusions contained in
its Memorandum Decision concerning, among other things, the award
of alimony

(R. 61-69).

See R. 61-69, Motion and Memorandum for

Reconsideration of Court's Ruling, a true and correct copy of which
is attached hereto as Addendum B;
18.
Memorandum

On July 19, 2 005, Ms. Richardson responded by filing her
in Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration of
7

Court's Ruling (R. 70-81).

See R. 70-81, Memorandum in Opposition

to the Motion for Reconsideration of Court's Ruling, a true and
correct copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum C;
19.

Almost five months later, the trial court, after duly

considering

the

parties

memoranda,

issued

a

thirteen-page

Memorandum Decision (R. 103-17), granting the Motion in part and
denying it in part.

See R. 103-17, Memorandum Decision, a true and

correct copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum D;
20.

On May 19, 2006, the trial court issued its Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Decree of Divorce (R. 213-41).
See R. 213-42, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the
Decree of Divorce, a true and correct copy of which is attached
hereto as Addendum E;
21.

On June 16, 2006, Mr. Richardson filed a timely Notice of

Appeal (R. 257-58) .

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.
issuing

The trial court soundly exercised its broad discretion by
an

equitable

order

for

termination of child support.

increased

requirement

upon

the

In the course of advancing his

argument on appeal, Mr. Richardson neglected
critical

alimony

underlying

both

to comply with a

appellate

procedure

and

appellate advocacy, namely, the duty to marshal the evidence when

8

challenging the trial court's findings of fact.

Mr. Richardson

attempts to couch the increased alimony issue on appeal as one
simply

involving

an

abuse

of

the

trial

court's

discretion.

However, Mr. Richardson is actually challenging the trial court's
underlying findings of fact supporting the increased alimony award.
Mr. Richardson simply takes the same position he took in his Motion
for reconsideration presented to the trial court, rearguing his
evidence on appeal.

By so doing, he makes no attempt to marshal

the evidence supporting the trial court's findings and then show
that the findings are unsupported.

Consequently, this Court should

affirm the trial courts award of increased alimony.
Notwithstanding

the failure to marshal, the trial court's

award of increased alimony is not only consonant with the general
purpose of alimony, it is consistent with Utah Code Ann. § 38-35(8) (c), dictating that the court consider all relevant facts and
equitable

principles

in

the

course

of

basing

alimony

standard of living that existed at the time of trial.

on

the

Further, the

award of increased alimony is consistent with Utah Code Ann. § 303-5(8) (d) , which
respective

allows

standards

of

the

court

living.

to

The

equalize

trial

the

court's

parties'
award

of

increased alimony merely amounted to an "equitable order" relating
to the obligations of the parties, which the trial court rendered

9

after due consideration of the parties' financial positions and
their standard of living.
As in Howell,

the parties in the instant case have a long-term

marriage, which, in turn, resulted in six children.
sacrificed

her ability to acquire

significant

Ms. Richardson

work

skills and

earning capacity to be the primary caretaker for a large family.
Furthermore, Ms. Richardson is middle-aged and is not likely to
significantly increase her earning capacity to the standard of
living enjoyed by the parties.
Hence,

the

trial

court's

award

in

the

instant

case

of"

increased alimony upon the termination of child support constitutes
an effort to attain the goal of maintaining a rough equivalence in
the parties' standard of living after a long-term marriage.

The

trial court's award was not based on speculation, but rather on
specific and detailed circumstances foreseeable at the time of the
divorce.
2.
of

The trial court exercised sound discretion in the course

equitably

awarding

retroactive

alimony.

Contrary

to

the

assertions of Mr. Richardson, the instant case is distinguishable
from the Osen

case in a number ways.

First, Mr. Richardson had

voluntarily made at least partial payments of temporary support
during the pendency of action, which made it unnecessary for Ms.
Richardson to request interim alimony.
10

Second, the retroactive

alimony award in the instant case was not an afterthought because
Ms. Richardson had requested alimony in the Petition for Divorce as
well as during her case-in-chief at trial.
The

trial

court

in the instant

case exercised

its broad

discretion to award retroactive alimony in the manner in which it
did based upon the "equitable" power to make orders relating to
support

obligations.

Further,

the

trial

court

appropriately

awarded retroactive alimony pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 3 0-35(8) (c) and

(d) , which require the trial court to "consider all

relevant fact and equitable principles in the course of awarding
alimony so as to equalize the parties' respective standards of
living.
Finally, allowing trial courts to make retroactive alimony
awards such as that in the instant case promotes sound public
policy by encouraging parties to resolve interim support matters
short of litigation and thereby promoting judicial economy.

ARGUMENTS
I.

THE TRIAL COURT SOUNDLY EXERCISED ITS BROAD
DISCRETION BY ISSUING AN EQUITABLE ORDER FOR
INCREASED ALIMONY UPON THE TERMINATION OF CHILD
SUPPORT•
A.

An

Principles of Law Governing Alimony

appellate

apportionment

of

court

will

financial

not

disturb

responsibilities
11

x

"a

trial

court's

in the absence of

manifest injustice or inequity that indicates a clear abuse of
discretion.'"

Hill

(quoting Maughan
1989)).

In

discretion
parties."

v.

fact,

968 p.2d 866, 869 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)

Maughan,
the

Hall

v. Hall,
v.

770 P. 2d 156, 161

trial

in determining

(citing Allred
1990)).

v. Hill,

the

court

is

(Utah Ct. App.

accorded

financial

"considerable

interests

of

divorced

858 P.2d 1018, 1021 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)

Allred,

797 P.2d

1108, 1111

The trial court's determinations

presumption of validity.'"

Allred,

Hansen

v. Hansen,

1055, 1056

denied,

765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987)).

736 P.2d

(Utah Ct. App.

"'are entitled to a

797 P. 2d at 1111

(quoting

(Utah Ct. App.), cert.

Generally, the purpose of alimony is to prevent the receiving
spouse from becoming a public charge and to maintain to the extent
possible

the

Howell

Howell,

v.

standard

of

living

enjoyed

during

the marriage.

806 P.2d 1209, 1212 (Utah App.), cert,

817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991).

denied,

The following three factors are to be

considered before awarding alimony:

(1) the financial needs and

condition of the recipient spouse; (2) the ability of the recipient
spouse to provide a sufficient income for himself or herself; and
(3) the ability of the payor spouse to provide
English
Chambers,

v.

English,

support.

565 P.2d 409, 411-12 (Utah 1977); Chambers

840 P.2d 841, 843 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).

See
v.

In addition to

these three factors, the trial court is to consider the following
12

four

factors

in determining

alimony:

(4) the

length of

the

marriage; (5) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor
children requiring support; (6) whether the recipient spouse worked
in a business owned or operated by the payor spouse; and

(7)

whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase
in the payor spouse's skill by paying for education received by the
payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse to attend school during
the marriage.

See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8) (a) (iv)-(vii) (Supp.

2005) .
B.

Principles of Law Governing the Trial
Court's Findings of Fact and a Challenge
to Those Findings of Fact

The trial court abuses its discretion to make an award of
alimony

when

it

fails

to

enter

specific,

supporting its financial determinations.
P.2d

1108, 1111

Bakanowski,
Burt,

(Utah Ct. App.

1990);

detailed

See Allred
see

also

findings

v. All red,

797

Bakanowski

v.

80 P.3d 153, 155 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) (citing Burt

799 P.2d 1166, 1170 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)).

v.

"Findings are

adequate only if they are 'sufficiently detailed and include enough
subsidiary

facts to disclose

the steps by which

conclusion on each factual issue was reached.'"

Hall

P.2d 1018, 1021 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quoting Allred,
1111); see also

Sukin

v. Sukin,

the ultimate
v.

Hall,

858

797 P.2d at

842 P.2d 922, 924 (Utah Ct. App.

1992) (stating that detailed findings are necessary to determine
13

whether the trial court exercised its discretion in a rational
manner).
A main thrust of Mr. Richardson's Brief is that the trial
court should not have issued an order for increased alimony upon
the termination of child support.

Obviously, Mr. Richardson seeks

to pay as little alimony as possible to Ms. Richardson.
However, in the course of advancing his argument on appeal,
Mr.

Richardson

neglected

the

following

critical

requirement

underlying both appellate procedure and appellate advocacy:

"the

duty to marshal the evidence when challenging the trial court's
Moon v.

findings of fact."
431.

Moon,

1999 UT App 12, 1(24, 973 P. 2d

In his Brief, Mr. Richardson attempts to couch the increased

alimony issue on appeal as one simply involving an abuse of the
trial court's discretion.

See Appellant's Brief, pp. 10-13.

A

closer review, however, reveals that Mr. Richardson is actually
challenging

the

trial

court's

underlying

supporting the increased alimony award.

findings

of

fact

This is demonstrated by

Mr. Richardson's argument on appeal making little or no mention of
the trial court's detailed findings that support the increased
alimony

award.

In

fact,

Mr.

14

Richardson

makes

no

argument,

whatsoever, that the trial court's findings of fact are inadequate
or insufficiently detailed to support its determination.1
When challenging the trial court's findings of fact, the act
of merely providing some citations to the record is insufficient
for purposes of appeal.

Rather, the appellant must marshal the

evidence.
The marshaling process is not unlike becoming
the devil's advocate. Counsel must extricate
himself or herself from the client's shoes and
fully assume the adversary's position.
In
order to properly discharge the duty of
marshaling the evidence, the challenger must
present, in comprehensive and
fastidious
order, every scrap of competent evidence
introduced at trial which supports the very
findings
the appellant
resists.
After
constructing
this
magnificent
array
of
supporting evidence, the challenger must
ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence. The
gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to
convince the appellate court that the court's
finding resting upon the evidence is clearly
erroneous.
Moon,

1999 UT App 12 at 1(24 (quoting West

Inv.

Co.,

Oneida/SLIC

818

P. 2d

v. Oneida

1311, 1315
Cold

(Utah Ct. App.

Storage

1051, 1053 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).

Valley

& Warehouse,

City

v.

Majestic

1991));
Inc.,

accord

872 P.2d

A successful challenge "induce[s]

a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made."

bindings of fact are overturned
erroneous. See Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) .
15

only

if

they

are

clearly

State

ex

denied,

rel.

N.H.B.,

111

P.2d 487, 493

(Utah Ct. App.), cert.

789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1989).

When the appellant

fails to meet the

marshaling the evidence, see

West

Valley

" 'heavy burden'" of

City,

818 P. 2d at 1315

(citation omitted), the appellate court "'assumes that the record
Wade v. Stangl,

supports the findings of the trial court.'"
P. 2d 9, 12

(Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Saunders

v.

869

Sharp,

8 06

P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991)).
Here, Mr. Richardson simply takes the same position he took in
his

Motion

rearguing
attempt

for

reconsideration

presented

his evidence on appeal.2

to marshal

the

evidence

to

the

trial

court,

By so doing, he makes no

supporting

the

trial

findings and then show that the findings are unsupported.

court's
For this

reason alone, this Court should affirm the trial courts award of
increased alimony.
In the course of making the award of increased alimony, the
trial court entered, among other things, the following findings of
fact :
1.

Ms. Richardson, by agreement of the parties and as
the "primary caretaker of the children prior to the
parties' separation" is entitled to "sole physical
and legal custody" (R. 214) ;

Moreover, Mr. Richardson does not challenge the trial court's
findings of fact concerning the estimation of his income, which
served both as the basis and a material consideration underlying the
trial court's award of increased alimony.
16

Mr. Richardson's income for purposes of child
support and alimony "is a total of $65,000 per
year, or $5,417.00 per month" (see R. 216), and,
after deductions, his net income before any alimony
tax benefits is $4,465.00 (R. 226);
Mr.
Richardson's
"reasonable
expenses"
are
$3,628.00 and therefore he has a "surplus of net
income over expenses of about $837.00 per month"
(R. 227); 3
Ms. Richardson's annual salary is "$21,927.00 or
$1,827.00 per month" (see R. 217), and, after
deductions, "[h]er net income for alimony purposes
is .
$1,512.00, and with the child support
payment of $1,375.00 per month, her total net
income "is therefore about $2,897.00" (see R. 224);
Ms. Richardson's "work experience is relatively
minimal because of the parties' decisions regarding
how their family would
function during the
marriage, with only short periods of part time
employment, and she does not appear to have
developed any specialized job skills."
{Id.);
"There was no evidence that [Ms. Richardson] had
either the opportunity or the capacity to earn more
than what she is making now" and "she is fully
employed in her present position at the present
rate of pay"
(Id.);
Ms. Richardson's general expenses "are reasonable,
especially considering that she is caring for four
(4) children" (see R. 224) and that her expenses
total "$3,306.00 per month", and that a "deficit
between her
income, including
initial
child
support, and her reasonable expenses is therefore
about $409.00 per month" (R. 225);

3

By way of its Findings of Fact, the trial court noted that
" [n]either party presented much evidence of their standard of living
at the time of separation" and consequently, the court relied
"primarily on evidence regarding their expenses as a fair substitute
or approximation." See R. 224.
17

"[I]t is significant that this is a long term
marriage in which [Ms. Richardson] gave up her
ability to improve her skills and earning capacity
to care for a large family" (R. 228);
" [T]hat alimony in the amount of $420.00 is a fair
and reasonable award"
(Id.);
"While a significant amount of [Ms. Richardson's]
expenses can now be attributed to minor children in
the home, a good part of the income needed by [her]
to maintain the appropriate standard of living is
also attributable to child support payments from
[Mr. Richardson]."
(Id.);
Because the children will reach the age of eighteen
(18) by way of regular occurrence over the next few
years, Ms. Richardson's "income will be reduced
disproportionately to the reduction of expenses
both because the reasonable expenses associated for
a
time
even with
older
children
will
not
necessarily diminish to zero as they reach eighteen
and because expenses . . . will not
necessarily be significantly or proportionately
reduce [d] even when children do leave home" (R.
228-29) ;
"[I]t is reasonable to increase alimony to some
extent as [Ms. Richardson's] income from child
support
payments
goes
down
and
as
[Mr.
Richardson's] expenses from such payments also
diminish" and "[t]his also contributes to the goal
of maintaining a rough equivalence in the parties'
standard of living after a long-term marriage." (R.
229);
"The alimony payments . . . should therefore
increase by $100.00 per month, beginning the first
day of the month after which each child turns
eighteen (18)"
{Id.);
"On this basis, when the last child turns eighteen
(18),
[Mr.
Richardson's]
income
will
have
increase[d] by about $1,375.00 per month, while
commensurate alimony increases to [Ms. Richardson]
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will amount to $400.00 per month, leaving him with
some cushion that takes into account the purported
increased costs of living in Alaska" and not
reducing the parties' standard of living
{Id.).
Notwithstanding

Mr.

Richardson's

failure

to

marshal

the

evidence, the trial court's award of increased alimony is not only
consonant with the general purpose of alimony, it is consistent
with the dictates set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5.

According

to § 38-3-5(8) (c), "the court shall consider all relevant facts and
equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on
the standard of living that existed at the time of trial."
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (8) (c) .

See

Moreover, according to § 30-3-

5(8) (d) , u[t]he court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt
to equalize the parties' respective standards of living."

This, in

fact,

case

is

what

the

trial

court

did

in

the

instant

specifically set forth in its findings of fact.

as

See R. 228-29.

The trial court's award of increased alimony merely amounted to an
"equitable order" relating to the obligations of the parties, which
the trial court rendered after due consideration of the parties'
financial positions and their standard of living.

See Utah Code

Ann. § 30-3-5 (1) .
Mr. Richardson argues that the award of increased alimony as
the parties' children turn eighteen and child support diminishes is
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contrary to law because it is speculative.

Utah law, however,

demonstrates otherwise.
Mr. Richardson cites to Howell

v.

Howell,

806 P.2d 1209 (Utah

Ct. App. 1991), in support of his argument on appeal.

The

Howell

case, however, actually demonstrates the reasonableness of the
trial court's award in the instant case.
As the Howell
considered

the

court recognized, "Utah's appellate courts have

appropriateness

marriage, where the wife
home,

has

fifties.

limited
Id.

of

after

a

long

term

(usually) has worked primarily in the

job skills, and

at 1213.

alimony

is in her

late

forties or

In that case, this Court reversed the trial

court's award of alimony because it failed to equalize the parties'
standard of living.

Id.

As a result, this Court remanded the case

for findings as to the parties' financial needs and standard of
living, and for adjustment of the alimony award to "better equalize
the parties' abilities to go forward with their respective lives."
Id.
Prior to Howell,

the Utah Supreme Court in Jones

v.

Jones,

700

P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985), determined that the trial court's award of
alimony was inadequate to allow the wife a standard of living even
approaching that experienced during the marriage and, in the course
of doing so, provided the following description of the marriage:

20

During most of the marriage, with the full
consent and support of her husband, [the wife]
devoted her time to raising their four
children and donating her services to various
social service organizations . . . .
It is
entirely unrealistic to assume that a woman in
her
mid-50's
with
no
substantial
work
experience or training will be able to enter
the job market and support herself in anything
even resembling the style in which the couple
had been living.
Id.

at 1075.4
As in Howell,

marriage,

which,

the parties in the instant case have a long-term
in

turn,

resulted

in

six

children.

Ms.

Richardson, for both the benefit of the family and Mr. Richardson's
career, sacrificed her ability to acquire significant work skills
and earning capacity to be the primary caretaker
family.

for a large

Moreover, Ms. Richardson is middle-aged and is not likely

to significantly increase her earning capacity to the standard of
living enjoyed by the parties.
Consequently, the trial court's award in the instant case of
increased alimony upon the termination of child support constitutes
an effort to attain the goal of maintaining a rough equivalence in
the

parties'

standard

of

living

after

a

long-term

4

marriage.

This Court, in the course of discussing the disparity between
the parties' incomes, noted that "' [i] f courts award child support in
lieu of permanent alimony, they may fail to anticipate the financial
impact on the remaining family as each child reaches age 18 and his
or her award terminates.'" Howell v. Howell,
806 P.2d 1209, 1213 n.2
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) (quoting March 1990 Utah Task Force on Gender

and Justice

Report

to the Utah Judicial
21

Council

38) .

Moreover, the trial court's award was not based on speculation, but
rather on specific and detailed circumstances "foreseeable at the
time of the divorce."

See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8) (g)(i).

II.

THE TRIAL COURT EXERCISED SOUND DISCRETION IN THE
COURSE OF EQUITABLY AWARDING RETROACTIVE ALIMONY.

Mr.

Richardson

argues

that

the

trial

court

abused

its

discretion by awarding retroactive alimony because Ms. Richardson
had

not

requested

conclusion of trial.

interim

or

retroactive

alimony

until

the

In support of the argument, Mr. Richardson

cites to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3(3), which states, "In any action
listed in Subsection (1), the court may order a party to provide
money, during the pendency of the action, for the separate support
and maintenance of the other party and of any children in the
custody of the other party."

See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3(3) . Mr.

Richardson also cites to Osen

v.

Osen,

U2000 UT App 90, 2000 WL

33249404, in support of his position.
In Osen,
of

an unpublished decision, this Court vacated the award

alimony because

the trial court, at

least

in part,

"mixed

property and support analysis to an unacceptable degree", which the
appellant
support.

characterized
Id.

as

a

retroactive

award

of

temporary

at *1. In a footnote within the Memorandum Decision,

this Court stated:
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Insofar as the trial court intended an award
of retroactive interim alimony, its award in
this context was contrary to the intent of the
statute, which allows a party to move for
interim alimony to meet the party's needs
between separation and divorce. See Utah Code
Ann. § 30-3-3(3) (1998) (stating "the court
may order a party to provide money, during
the
pendency of the action") (emphasis added). It
was not
intended to be awarded as an
afterthought in the final decree - especially
when not requested by the benefitting party.
See id.
§ 30-3-3(4) (allowing amendment to
interim alimony entered "prior
to entry of the
final order") (emphasis added).
Id.

n.l.

This Court, however, specifically recognized that the

trial court's approach was "particularly inappropriate because the
court found that appellee's reasonable expenses did not exceed her
income."
need

Jd.

Consequently, the appellee had not demonstrated a

for alimony, which precluded

(citing Georgedes

v. Georgedes,

any award of alimony.

Jd.

627 P.2d 44, 46 (Utah 1981)).

The instant case is distinguishable from Osen in at least two
ways.

First, Mr. Richardson had voluntarily made at least partial

payments of temporary support during the pendency of action, which
made it unnecessary for Ms. Richardson to request interim alimony.
See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3(4)

(allowing amendment to interim

alimony in the final order or judgment).

Second, the retroactive

alimony award in the instant case was not an afterthought because
Ms. Richardson had requested alimony in the Petition for Divorce as

23

well as during her case-in-chief at trial.5
Divorce, 1121; R. 304:39:15; see
that

xx

also

See R. 6, Petition for

Utah R. Civ. P. 15(b) (stating

[w] hen issues not raised by the pleading are tried by express

or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all
respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings").
The

trial

court

in the

instant

case

exercised

its broad

discretion to award retroactive alimony in the manner in which it
did based upon the "equitable" power to make orders relating to
See

support obligations.
Curry

v.

Curry,

321

Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(1); see

P.2d

939,

942,

7

Utah

2d

198

also
(1958)

(recognizing that "the trial court is vested with broad equitable
powers

in divorce

disturbed

lightly,

matters
nor

at

and

that

all

its

unless

judgment
the

will

evidence

not be
clearly

preponderates against his findings, or there has been a plain abuse
of discretion, or a manifest injustice or inequity is wrought");

5

Because the matter was raised during trial, any argument that
Mr. Richardson was prejudiced is without merit.
Moreover, by
essentially waiting to raise the retroactive alimony issue until the
Motion for reconsideration, Mr. Richardson arguably waived the
matter, which, in turn, conjures up notions of invited error.
See
Wilcox
v. Anchor
Wate Co., 2006 UT 67, ^4 7 n.56 (citing State
v.
Geukgeuzian,
2004 UT 16, ^9, 86 P.3d 742 (holding that under invited
error a party "cannot take advantage of an error committed at trial
when that party led the trial court into committing the error"
(quotations and citation omitted)) and State
v. Anderson,
929 P.2d
1107, 1109 (Utah 1996) (" [D]efendant cannot lead the court into error
by failing to object and then later, when he is displeased with the
verdict, profit by his actions." (quotations and citation omitted)).
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cf.

Wilde

v. Wilde,

2001 UT App 318, 1J23, 35 P. 3d 341 (concluding

that "trial courts have the discretion to award modified alimony
retroactively to the date a modification petition is served").
Further, the trial court appropriately awarded retroactive alimony
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(c) and (d), which require
the

trial

court

to

"consider all relevant

fact

and

equitable

principles in the course of awarding alimony so as to equalize the
parties' respective standards of living.
Finally, allowing trial courts to make retroactive alimony
awards such as that in the instant case promotes sound public
policy by encouraging parties to resolve interim support matters
short of litigation and thereby promoting judicial economy.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Ms. Richardson respectfully asks that
this Court affirm the trial court's award of alimony, and that the
Court

grant

her

any

other

relief

the

Court

deems

just

appropriate under the circumstances.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 29th day of January, 2007.
ARNOLD V WIGGINS, P.C.

S^ttL/Wi^ins
Attorneys r^Sj^ppellee
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Tab A

THIRD DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KYNDA KAY RICHARDSON,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Issues presented at trial)

Petitioner,
vs.

Case No. 034905249
Judge Stephen L. Roth

KENNETH ANDRE W RICHARDSON,
Respondent.

The bench trial in this matter took place on February 8, 2005, with Joseph L. Nemelka,
Joseph Lee Nemelka, P.C., representing petitioner Kynda Kay Richardson ("Kynda") and J. Bruce
Reading, Scalley & Reading, P.C., representing respondent Kenneth Andrew Richardson
("Kenneth"). Having considered the evidence presented at trial and the arguments of counsel, the
court makes the following decision.
DECISION
A.

JURISDICTION and GROUNDS.
As a threshold matter, the court notes that Kynda has lived in Salt Lake County since January

2003, soon after the separation of the parties in about mid-2002, and therefore concludes that it has
jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this case. Further, the parties have come to
disagree deeply over crucial aspects of their life together, perhaps most importantly over the
approach to raising and disciplining their children. While Kenneth states that he does not desire a
divorce, the parties had the benefit of counseling before the filing of the Petition, have been
separated for over two years and have established separate lives. The court concludes that there are

grounds for entering a decree of divorce based on the existence of irreconcilable differences that
prevent the marriage from continuing.
B.

CHILD CUSTODY and SUPPORT
There were six children born to this marriage, of whom four are still minors: Dana May

Richardson, born May 17, 1987, Kyle Allen Richardson, born July 19, 1988, Avery Keen
Richardson, born August 21, 1990, and Justin Wallace Richardson, born march 25, 1993. The
parties do not contest child custody and appear to be in agreement that Kynda should have sole
physical and legal custody. Kynda was the primary caretaker for the children prior to the parties'
separation and the children continue to live with her at their present home in West Valley City, while
Kenneth has remained in Alaska, where the parties lived since their marriage in Anchorage on
August 20, 1980. Kynda appears to strongly desire custody, and she has been and continues to be
a fit parent. There is no indication that the children have any different custody preference. The court
concludes that Kynda is and has been a fit and proper parent, that there is no reason to disturb the
parties' own agreement with respect to custody, and that it is in the best interests of the children that
she be awarded sole physical and legal custody. Parent time issues will be addressed below.
For purposes of the child support calculation, gross income includes income from almost any
source, other than those specifically excluded by the statute. See U.C.A. § 78-45-7.7(1). At the time
of trial Kenneth was working full time for Aurora Electric in Anchorage as a project
manager/estimator, earning a salary of $ 1,188.47 per week according to a January 28,2005 employer
earnings statement about $61,800 per year. Apparently some time in 2003, after the parties'
separation, Kenneth was promoted to this supervisory position from the journeyman electrician
position that he had formerly held at Aurora Electric. He received a lower salary in the prior
position, but normally and consistently worked substantial overtime (more than 40 hours per week)
-2-

during the marriage and thus earned about $5,000 (2001 W-2) to $6,000 (2002 W-2) more each year
than he does now, because, as a supervisor, overtime is no longer available to him. Kenneth testified
that he took the promotion because it was a job change that he wanted and because his boss urged
him to take the new position for the benefit of the company. While there is no indication other than
timing that Kenneth took the promotion in order to deliberately reduce his income for purposes of
this proceeding, this was in significant part a voluntary decision on his part that reduced his income.
For this reason, the court believes that it is fair to consider his previous scrapping activities (in which
he made up to $1,000 per year from time to time) as a source of income still open to him and to
consider his historical overtime. In all, the court believes that it is reasonable to impute $ 1,700 per
year as a reasonable assessment of Kenneth's additional earning capacity for purposes of child
support and alimony calculations, giving him some latitude to make changes in his work position
to accommodate reasonable work-related goals, while recognizing that those changes are largely
voluntary, as well as taking into account his ability to make additional income, as he has in the past,
from scrapping or other work.
In addition, Kenneth receives an annual distribution made to all citizens of the State of
Alaska. The most recent such distribution was $ 1,984, and Kenneth testified that it was sometimes
less and sometimes more. This annual payment falls within the broad scope of gross income under
the statute, and the court concludes that the $ 1,984 figure is a reasonable estimate of ongoing income
from this source for purposes of calculating gross income (for child support and alimony).
Kenneth's gross income for child support purposes is therefore $61,800 plus $1,700 plus $1,984: a
total of $65,484 per year or $5,457 per month.
Kynda is employed by the State of Utah, working full time. Her last pay stub for 2004
showed her annual salary to be $21,927 or $ 1,827 per month. Kynda's work experience is relatively
-3-

minimal because of the parties' decisions regarding how their family would function during the
marriage. After about a year of employment, Kynda cared for the children at home during the
marriage, with only short periods of part time employment, and she does not appear to have
developed any specialized job skills. There was no evidence that she had either the opportunity or
the capacity to earn more than what she is making now; and the court concludes that she is fully
employed in her present position at her present rate of pay, which is her gross income.
There was no evidence that either party was obligated to any other person for alimony or
child support outside the bounds of this case, and therefore gross income and adjusted gross income
are the same for each party. These figures are therefore to be used for calculating the share of child
support attributable to each party, with Kenneth to be the obligated party.
The parties propose that they should each be allocated tax deductions for two children, but
disagree on which. No real basis for allocation was presented other than the representation that
Kynda needed at least one child deduction to be eligible for a tax benefit. It therefore appears to the
court that it is fair to allocate the tax deductions as follows: Dana and Justin to Kynda and Kyle and
Avery to Kenneth. When Dana reaches eighteen, the exemptions should alternate to equalize the
benefits as much as possible, with Kenneth having the deductions for two children and Kynda for
one the first year in which there are only three deductions available, Kynda having two and Kenneth
one in the second year, and so on. When the deductions for children reduce to two, each parent may
claim one deduction; when there is only one deduction left, that deduction goes to Kynda. In the
alternative, for any tax year the party for whom the exemption(s) is most valuable may elect to
purchase the option(s) from the other party for the amount the other party would lose if the
exemption were not available.

-4-

Child support should be paid retroactive from date of separation (which the court believes
was sometime around January 2003), with Kenneth to be credited for amounts paid since that time
against his obligations for child support and alimony.
C.

PERSONAL PROPERTY
The evidence at trial indicated disagreement over the value and division of the certain

personal property acquired during the marriage. This involved essentially a savings account
containing about $1,000, a certificate of deposit in the amount of approximately $6,000, a set of
firearms collected by Kenneth, tools, certain items of apparel made of animal fur, a Bobcat tractor,
and three vehicles: a van in Kynda's possession and two trucks (a 1981 Dodge Dakota and a 2003
Ford Ranger) in Kenneth's possession. The parties agreed at the end of trial that Kynda receive the
savings account, the certificate of deposit and the van and that Kenneth be awarded the two trucks,
the tools, the firearm collection, the Bobcat tractor, and the fur items. The court has no reason to
believe that this division is not fair and equitable and therefore concludes that it is.
There is also a New York Life insurance policy on Kenneth's life with a $50,000 face amount
and a cash value of about $6,300. Kenneth proposed that the policy be cashed out and the proceeds
be shared equally between him and Kynda. It was not clear to the court what Kynda wanted in this
regard. It appears to the court that it would be of some value to the parties and in the children's
interest to keep the insurance policy in place, with Kenneth to pay the premiums, having the minor
children irrevocably designated as the beneficiaries and Kynda as the trustee for the minor children.
Once the last child is emancipated, the policy is to be cashed in, with Kynda to receive within 60
days thereafter one-half of the cash value of the policy, valued as of the time of trial. The parties
have the option, if they both agree to do so, of cashing the policy in now, with the amount received
in payment to be divided equally between them.
-5-

D.

REAL PROPERTY
There are two parcels of real property at issue, the marital home in Eagle River, Alaska, near

Anchorage, and an unimproved, .92 acre lot located in subdivision in Willow, Alaska. Neither
property is encumbered by a mortgage or other significant lien. The parties appear to agree that the
equity in each property should be divided between them, but they disagree about the value of each
property.
Kynda believed the Willow lot to be worth about $ 10,000, based on unspecified calls to real
estate agents in the area. Kenneth estimated the lot to be worth $3,000 to $4,000 and said that it had
an assessment value on the tax notice of $4,200. The court believes that an estimated value of
$5,000 is reasonable approximation of the value of the lot, given the sparse information presented.
Kynda is to receive $2,500 as her share of the Willow lot's value.
The Eagle River home was purchased about 20 years ago for about $50,000. It was appraised
in early 2004 at $60,000. Kenneth says the appraisal is incorrect because it indicates that the house,
a modular house, has sanitary sewer, asphalt street and curb and gutter, which is does not have. He
believes it is worth $47,000 based on a tax assessment and on his estimate that it will take about
$13,000 to connect the house to municipal sewer, a step he says is necessary to make the house
saleable. Kynda says she believes the appraisal is correct, even without a sewer hook-up, and that
the house cannot have depreciated in value since it was purchased. The appraisal indicates that
property values in the area are increasing, and no evidence was presented on how property tax
assessments were made. Kenneth has presented no reliable evidence of the effect on property value
of the lack of a sewer hook-up, much less that the value would be directly related to the cost of
providing such an improvement.

Nor has he presented any evidence of how property tax
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assessments are made in the area or how reliable an indication of actual value they are or that
property values have decreased since the purchase of the property for $50,000 over twenty years ago.
The court believes that the appraisal is the most reliable indication of value under the
circumstances and finds that the house is worth $60,000 at the time of trial and the equity should be
divided equally, with the house to be sold and the net proceeds split equally between the parties. In
the alternative, if Kenneth wants to keep the house, he must pay $30,000 to Kynda.
E.

ALIMONY
u

[T]he purpose of alimony is to prevent the receiving spouse from becoming a public charge

and to maintain the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage to the extent possible." Howell
v. Howell, 806P.2d 1209,1212 (Ut.Ct.App. 1991), citing Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218,1223
(Utah 1980). The Supreme Court, in Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985), set out "three
factors that must be considered in fixing a reasonable alimony award: [1] the financial conditions
and needs of the wife; [2] the ability of the wife to produce a sufficient income for herself; and [3]
the ability of the husband to provide support." Id. at 1075 (edits by the court; citations omitted);
U.C.A. § 30-3-5(8) (which expands the number of factors to be considered, while retaining the Jones
factors as the essence of the inquiry). After the determination of the needs and resources of both
parties using the Jones factors, "the court should set alimony as permitted by those parameters, to
approximate the parties' standard of living during the marriage as closely as possible." Howell, 806
P.2d at 1212. In the case of a long-term marriage, the alimony award "should, 'to the extent
possible, equalize the parties' respective standards of living and maintain them at a level as close as
possible to the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage.'" Id, quoting Gardner v. Gardner,
748 P.2d 1076,1081 (Utah 1988); cf. Howell, 806 P.2d at 1216 n.4 ("The alimony award, however,
need not be large enough to maintain the receiving spouse at the standard of living enjoyed during
-7-

the marriage if that amount of alimony would lower the standard of living of the paying spouse
below that of the receiving spouse."). Having considered "all relevant facts and equitable
principles," the court "may, in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that existed at
the time of trial." U.C.A. § 30-3-5(8)(c).
Kynda's income, as discussed above, is $ 1,827 per month. Accepting the annual deductions
from her salary as set out in her 2004 year-end pay stub, they are Federal Tax ($465.10), Social
Security Tax ($ 1,286.53), Medicare Tax ($300.88), State tax ($551.73), and health dental and vision
insurance (together $ 1,176.52), for a total monthly deduction of about $315.00. Her net income for
alimony purposes is therefore $1,512. (The court is not considering deductions for life insurance for
either party because essentially voluntary (on the part of Kynda) or building cash value from this
point forward (on the part of Kenneth)). Child support payments will be approximately $1,375 per
month. Total net income, without consideration of alimony tax consequences, is therefore about
$2,897.
As to general expense deductions, the court believes that Kynda's monthly expenses, as set
forth in Exhibit 7, are reasonable, especially considering that she is caring for four children.1 While
she filed a financial declaration earlier that stated lower expenses, the court found credible her
explanation that she had been keeping expenses deliberately low during that period because of the
financial uncertainties of the unresolved divorce and had increased her expenses to a more normal
level during 2004, the subject period for Exhibit 7. Those deductions are supported by detailed
monthly expense reports. Nevertheless, Exhibit 7 contains some expenses that the court considers

1

Neither party presented much evidence of their standard of living at the time of separation,
so the court is relying primarily on evidence regarding their expenses as a fair substitute or
approximation.
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as either one-time costs or not allowable for purposes of alimony determination. Those include
attorneys fees and mediation costs related to the divorce in the amount of $ 1,331. They also include
$1,779 in what appear to be one-time costs for the purchase of appliances ($906.10 to Maytag on
January 26 and $873.05 to Maytag on February 7), although the court believes that one-half that
amount (about $890) is a reasonable annual budget for general maintenance of a home and its
contents over the long term, given the number of children in her care and the need to furnish a
separate house, and ought to be included as an expense. Because the testimony indicated that the
parties historically have made donations to their church at about 10% of income and continue to do
so, each listing such donations as part of their expenses, the court considers these donations as a
continuing part of their previous and present standards of living and will include them as reasonable
expenses for both parties. Deducting $185 per month for one-time expenses, her reasonable
expenses are $3,306 per month.
The deficit between her income, including initial child support, and her reasonable expenses
is therefore about $409 per month.
Kenneth's income, as discussed above, is $5,457 per month. This amounts to salary of
$61,800 per year, plus$ 1,984 state payment and $ 1,700 additional attributed income, per the analysis
set forth above. Deductions, per his weekly Direct Deposit Earnings Statement, include Medicaid
($16.94), social security ($72.45), federal tax ($117.85), local tax ($5.40) and health insurance
($ 10.25). The court is not considering deductions for 401 (k) contributions, a medical flex plan and
a 401(k) loan repayment. The loan repayment deduction (amounting to about $193 per month) is
to pay off a $ 10,000 loan Kenneth took out of his retirement plan in 2003, after the separation, to pay
attorney' s fees ($5,000), a down payment on a new truck ($3,000), and a deposit in a savings account
($2,000). The court does not believe the repayments on this loan, given its timing and the use of the

proceeds, ought to be counted as a deduction from salary for alimony purposes. Other deductions
appear reasonable. Similarly, the medical flex plan is a voluntary contribution (about $ 10 per week)
that can be used to pay medical expenses as they arise (apparently deductibles and other expenses
not covered by insurance). Because this is essentially a medical savings plan for the benefit of the
respondent, it should not be counted as a true deduction for alimony purposes.
The total weekly deductions from salary are therefore about $223 or about $966 per month.
Including an additional $26 per month to account for a proportional amount of deductions for the
imputed $ 1700 per year (there was no evidence that the state payment of $ 1982 per year was taxed),
the total deductions are about $992 per month, leaving a net income, before any alimony tax benefit,2
of $4,465.
The expenses Kenneth listed in Exhibit 15, appeared to be generally reasonable, and the court
is using that exhibit as a base for determining Kenneth's reasonable expenses, with certain
exceptions, as discussed below. Kenneth claims total monthly expenses of $3,911.47. In addition,
if Kenneth takes out a mortgage on the Eagle River house to pay off the equity, he will have to make
payments on that loan. Because of his age, a 15-year amortization is reasonable, requiring a monthly
payment of about $250 at an interest rate of about 6%. This is a reasonable additional expense, as
Kenneth does not have any rent or mortgage payment now and intends to remain in the house and
not sell it. Further, Kenneth has allocated about $1,350 for child support payments, when the total
is closer to $1,375, based on the parties' combined incomes of about $7,284 per month, allocated
about 25% to Kynda and 75% to Kenneth. These amounts should be added as expenses.

2

There was no evidence of the effect of alimony payments on Kenneth's tax liability or
alimony receipt on Kynda's, but the court does not believe that tax considerations related to alimony
would substantially alter the conclusions reached here.

Some expenses the court believes should not be included. As discussed above, the court does
not believe that the expenses for repayment of the 401(k) loan (about $193 per month) and life
insurance (which the court estimates at $65 per month based on the absence of any other evidence
other than respondent's claim to have $165 in monthly expenses for all insurance other than
deducted health insurance premiums) should be included for purposes of alimony determination, as
they are not necessities, and neither party urged their inclusion. In addition, Kenneth claims a total
of $350 per month in medical and dental expenses. There was no evidence of a need for health care
that would support expenses at that level, especially since he apparently has employer-provided
health insurance for which amounts are deducted from his salary; and absent any evidence of
particular health conditions requiring treatment, the court believes that $50 per month is reasonable.
Kenneth's reasonable expenses are therefore about $3,628.
Kenneth therefore has a surplus of net income over expenses of about $837 per month.3
Other than the equity in the marital home, the parties have accumulated little in the way of
resources to supplement their incomes. Considering Kynda's financial condition and needs and her
inability to provide sufficient income to meet those needs, together with Kenneth's ability to provide
support and the significant income differential between them even taking into account the payment
and receipt of child support, the court concludes that Kenneth should pay alimony to Kynda. In
addition, the court believes it is significant that this is a long term marriage in which Kynda gave up
her ability to improve her work skills and earning capacity to care for a large family, so that should
play a part in the determination of alimony amount, as well. See Howell, 806 P.2d at 1213. The

3

The court notes that, while both the parties and the court have used figures for income and
expenses that appear quite specific, these figures in reality are approximations, especially as they are
meant to ultimately represent amounts received and spent in the future. In determining alimony, the
court recognizes and takes into account the imprecision of the amounts involved.
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court believes that alimony in the amount of $420 is a fair and reasonable award. This sum
approximates the petitioner's need, before consideration of the alimony tax consequences, and falls
within respondent's capacity to pay, as determined by the court.
While a significant amount of her expenses can now be attributed to minor children in the
home, a good part of the income needed by Kynda to maintain the appropriate standard of living is
also attributable to child support payments from Kenneth. As children reach the age of eighteen,
which will be a regular occurrence over the next few years, the court believes that Kynda's income
will be reduced disproportionately to the reduction of expenses both because the reasonable expenses
associated for a time even with older children will not necessarily diminish to zero as they reach 18
years old and because some expenses, such as mortgage, utilities and so on will not necessarily be
significantly or proportionately reduced even when children do leave the home. For that reason, the
court concludes that it is reasonable to increase alimony to some extent as Kynda's income from
child support payments goes down and as Kenneth's expenses from such payments also diminish.
This also contributes to the goal of maintaining a rough equivalence in the parties' standard of living
after this long-term marriage. Id. (considering the effects of diminishing child support obligations
as children reach 18 on the relative disparity of income between spouses). The alimony payments
due to Kynda should therefore increase by $ 100 per month, beginning the first day of the month after
which each child turns eighteen. On this basis, when the last child turns eighteen, Kenneth's income
will have increased by about $1,375 per month, while commensurate alimony increases to Kynda
will amount to $400 per month, leaving him with some cushion that takes into account the purported
increased cost of living in Alaska and not reducing his standard of living below Kynda's.
Alimony should continue for a period equal to the length of the marriage. Changes in
income due to retirement at a reasonable age are not taken into account here and may be considered
-12-
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as changes of circumstances in the future, if otherwise appropriate. Alimony should be paid
retroactive to the time of separation.
F.

PARENT TIME
While it is apparent that Kenneth loves his children, during the marriage he took a decidedly

harsher approach to their discipline than did Kynda, going to the extreme of punishing them by the
use of a belt on occasion and threatening to do so more regularly. The court believes that this goes
beyond acceptable limits on discipline of children and it apparently played a part in the break up of
the marriage. The children remain somewhat intimidated by their father, and their distance from
him, both emotional and geographical at this point, has been exacerbated by his decision that it
would be best under the circumstances of the separation to contact them infrequently. While his
telephone contacts have recently increased, he has seen the children only a few times since the
separation. Some or all of the children have been in counseling to deal in part with issues involving
their father.
The court believes that it is in the best interests of the children to reestablish their relationship
with their father as soon as possible and that his access to them be as liberal as the distances involved
allow, at a minimum in accordance with the applicable guidelines for parent time. Under the
circumstances, there should be a gradual increase in parent time up to guideline standards, beginning
with visits here to Salt Lake City, where Kenneth should attend counseling sessions with the
children's therapist and any further individual counseling reasonably recommended to facilitate the
transition to regular parent time. During the course of this process, the parties should formulate a
reasonable parenting plan with the input of the children's therapist, which should be in place by the
time regular visitation is ready to begin. By saying this, the court believes that the parties should

seek the therapist's input on the nature and timing of this process and that the goal should be to make
this transitional period as short as possible.
G.

ATTORNEY FEES
Based on the court's assessment that Kynda's expenses are beyond her income and other

resources at this point and on its conclusion that Kenneth's resources provide him with a surplus
over his expenses (as discussed in connection with alimony, above), the court concludes that
Kenneth should be responsible to pay Kynda's reasonable attorney fees incurred in this matter.
Kynda has insufficient income to meet her needs, and alimony payments will bring her income up
to the point where her needs are met, not including attorney fees. Kenneth will have a level of
surplus and is more able to pay fees.

Kynda should provide evidence of the amount and

reasonableness of the fees she claims to the court.
CONCLUSION
The court has set out a number of findings and conclusions in its analysis. Counsel for
petitioner is to prepare findings of fact and conclusions of law that take into account other matters
that ought to be included but were resolved before trial and should include additional findings and
conclusions from the evidence presented reasonably necessary to support the court's ruling.
DATED this.o<6Aday of June, 2005.
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vs.
Civil No. 034905249 DA
Judge Stephen L. Roth
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K E N N E T H A N D R E W RICHARDSON,

Respondent.
Respondent, Kenneth Andrew Richardson, by and through his attorneys, moves the Court to
reconsider the findings and conclusions contained in its Memorandum Decision of June 2, 2005
(hereinafter, "Court's Ruling"). In summaiy, Respondent requests that the Court reconsider the following:
1.

Reconsideration of the alimony award, based u p o n (a) inaccurate income and deduction
figures; (b) prospective changes in the amount and retroactive application; and (c) improper
consideration of tithing payments.

2.

Petitioner's ability to pay attorney fees as a result of the retroactive alimony award.

3.

T h e Court's failure to give adequate guidance regarding the implementation of a parent-time
plan.

4.

T h e Court's failure to address the division of the parties' retirement accounts.
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This Motion for Reconsideration is supported by a memorandum.
DATED this

7

day of July, 2005.
SCALLEY & R E A D I N G ,

P.C.

"e Reading
Attorney for Respondent
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I N T H E T H I R D JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
I N A N D FOR SALT LAKE C O U N T Y , STATE OF U T A H
KYNDA KAY RICHARDSON,
M E M O R A N D U M I N SUPPORT OF M O T I O N FOR

Petitioner

RECONSIDERATION

vs.
K E N N E T H A N D R E W RICHARDSON,

Civil No. 034905249 DA
Judge Stephen L. Roth
Commissioner Susan Bradford

Respondent.
Respondent, Kenneth Andrew Richardson, by and through his attorneys, submits this
Memorandum in support of his Motion to Reconsider the ruling contained in the Memorandum Decision
of June 2, 2005 (hereinafter, "Court's Ruling"):
ARGUMENT

I.

The Alimony Award is Improper Because: (a) the Court's Ruling Regarding
Respondent's Income Are Inaccurate; (b) Future Changes in Alimony Are Available
Only Through a Petition to Modify; and (c) Tithing Payments Were Improperly
Considered as a Component of Petitioner's Needs

Because the alimony award of $420.00 per month is based upon an artificially inflated estimate of
Respondent's available income, the award should be reduced. Furthermore, under Utah law, changes in
alimony can only be made pursuant to a petition to modify. This requirement cannot be avoided by
building changes into to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (liereinafter, "Findings"), based upon

to.

speculation about future events. Finally, tithing is not a proper component of Petitioner's needs for
purposes of determining alimony.
A.

T h e Ruling Overestimate Respondent's Ability to Pay Alimony

The Court's Ruling overestimates Respondent's ability to pay alimony because it overstates
Respondent's available income. Page 3 of the Ruling ragraph 4 of the Findings of states, incorrectly, that
Respondent recently received a distribution from the state of Alaska in the amount of $1,984.00. Instead,
Petitioner actually received a distribution in the amount of $919.00, as shown at trial.
The Court should therefore impute ongoing payments from the state of Alaska based upon
imputed annual payments of $919.00, thus reducing Respondent's annual income by $1,065.00.
Respondent's annual income, before deductions, should therefore be $62,719.00 (or $5,226.58 per month).
After deductions of $992.00 per month, as stated in paragraph 20 of the Findings, Respondent's monthly
available income is $4,234.58 per month.
In addition, the Court has imputed income from Respondent's scrapping activity. Testimony at trial
was this scrapping was done while he was in the field working at his full-time job. H e is now in
administration and does not have scrapping available to him anymore.
B.

N e i t h e r Prospective Changes in Alimony, N o r Retroactive Alimony, Can Be
Built Into a D e c r e e of Divorce

T h e Court's ruling improperly implements retroactive alimony, and prospective increases in alimony
as Respondent's child support payments decrease. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(g)(ii) provides, however, that
courts may n o t modify alimony to address the needs of a recipient that did not exist at the time of entry of
the decree of divorce. Furthermore, the Utah Court of Appeals has unequivocally stated that "any
changes

in alimonyare

future

liirdted to instances where a material change of circumstances has occurred." See
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Howe//P. Howe//, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (emphasis added).

Howe//also mandates that the "the

standard of living existing at or near the time of trial" is the appropriate benchmark for determining an
alimony award. See id. at 1212.
The Court's Ruling directly contravenes both the Howell decision and Utah Code Ann. § 30-35(g)(ii). Petitioner's future needs and Respondent's future ability to pay should not be pre-judged by the
Court. See also Nelson v. Nelson, 97 P.3d 722, 723-24 (Utah Ct. A p p . 2004) (explaining that a motion to
terminate alimony, based upon the petitioner's prospective reduction in income upon retirement, was not
ripe for decision because petitioner had not yet retired; as such there was not a justiciable "'imminent clash
of legal rights and obligations'"). If the Court prospectively increases alimony payments at specifically
scheduled future times, its decision will be based primarily u p o n speculation rather than upon any actual
change the circumstances of the parties.
Based upon Howell, Nelson, and Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(g)(ii), the Court's Ruling should specify
what alimony should currently be, based upon Respondent's needs at the time of the entry of the divorce
decree. N o future times or contingencies should be considered because there is no way of determining in
advance the future needs and abilities of the parties.
Likewise, the award of alimony, retroactive to the time of separation is improper. See Findings at ^J
25. As the court pointed out in Osen v. Osen, (Unreported Memorandum Decision), April 6, 2000, W L
33249404 (Utah Ct. App.), retroactive awards are
contrary to the intent of the statute, which allows a party to move for interim
alimony to meet the party's needs between separation and divorce. See Utah
Code A n n . § 30-3- 3(3) (1998) (stating "the court may order a party to
provide money, during the pendency of the action") (emphasis added). It
was not intended to be awarded as an afterthought in the final
decree—especially when not requested by the benefitting party. See id. §
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30-3-3(4) (allowing amendment to interim alimony entered "prior to entry of
the final order") (emphasis added).
By failing to move for interim alimony, Petitioner waived any claim for it. Retroactive alimony
should therefore not be awarded.
C.

The Court's Ruling Improperly Consider Tithing Payments as a "Need" of
Petitioner

Because tithing payments, or other charitable giving, have nothing to do with a person's standard of
living, they should not have been considered by the Court in determining the alimony award. In
determining an alimony award, the trial court must consider, among other things, the following factors: (1)
the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; (2) the earning capacity of the recipient spouse; (3)
the ability of the obligor spouse to pay alimony; and (4) the length of the marriage. See Rehn v. Rehn, 974
P.2d 306, 310 (Utah Ct. App. 1999); Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985); see also Utah Code Ann.
§ 30-3-5(8)(a)(i)-(iv).
The purpose of alimony is to '"equalize the parties' respective post-divorce living standards . . ." to
the extent possible. See Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327
(Utah 1991) (quoting Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah Ct.App.1980).
As far as Respondent can determine, there is no Utah case or statute that authorizes the
consideration of tithing as a factor in determining an alimony award. The Utah Court of Appeals has
defined "standard of living" as "a minimum of necessities, comforts, or luxuries that is essential to
maintaining a person in customary or proper status or circumstances." Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1211
(Utah Ct. App. 1991), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991) {citing Webster's Third New International
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Dictionary 2223 (1986)). Charitable donations and tithing are unrelated to a party's own necessities,
comforts, and luxuries, and should therefore not be considered in determining an alimony award.
II-

If Retroactive Alimony is Permitted, then Petitioner Will H a v e Sufficient I n c o m e to
Pay H e r Attorney F e e s , Making the Award of Attorney F e e s to Petitioner Improper

The award of retroactive alimony, if it stands, will be a windfall for Petitioner. There was no
evidence that Petitioner incurred debts in order to survive from the time of separation to the time of trial.
Apparently, Petitioner was able to reduce her expenses during this period and to manage her financial affairs
adequately. T h e award of retroactive alimony therefore amounts to $10,500.00 windfall (twenty five months
from the parties' separation to the time of trial, multiplied by $420.00). This is more than enough to enable
Petitioner to pay her attorney fees of $5,280.00, as claimed in the Affidavit of Attorney Fees filed by her
counsel in this matter.
Even if the Court believes the award of attorney fees to Petitioner is proper, Respondent object to
the Affidavit of Attorney Fees, submitted by Petitioner's counsel, because it fails to meet the requirements
of Rule 73 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Under the rule, all such affidavits must set forth "a
reasonably detailed description of the time spent and work performed. . ." See Utah R. Civ. P. 73(b)(2).
Petitioner's counsel merely states his hours, but fails to detail the work performed. As such, his
request fails to comply with Rule 73 and should be denied.
III.

T h e Findings Improperly D e l e g a t e the Responsibility to Determine Parent-Time to
the Parties

Section 30-3-35 of the Utah Code establishes the minimum parent time to which a noncustodial
parent is entitled "unless a parent can establish otherwise by a preponderance of the evidence that more or
less parent-time should be awarded . . ." See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-34(2). N o such proof was provided by
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the preponderance of the evidence. But that being said, the Court has suggested a "gradual increase in
parent time" with such transition beginning with visits in Salt Lake City with Respondent attending
counseling with the children's therapist. In addition, Respondent should attend any individual counseling
recommended.
The problem with this procedure is the children are not in therapy, so there is no counseling to
attend. Further, many child therapists will not give therapy to adults. There is nothing in the order to
indicaute what should happen in that circumstance. W h o is the individual to recommend individual
counseling and how does the individual counselor give input to the visitation schedule? More guidance is
needed.
Finally, the Court has ordered the parties to formulate a reasonable parenting plan. The Respondent
has requested visitation on at least 20 occasions since separation to the present and has only been allowed
visitation six occasions. Again, there is no child therapist in existence to assist in the parenting plan. The
parties cannot agree — that is why trial was necessary.
There is a need for further guidance from the Court.
DATED this

^7

day of July. 2005.
SCALLEY & R E A D I N G ,

P.C.

Bpdce Reading
Attorney for Respondent
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I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, and faxed a true and exact copy of the foregoing
document to the following party on the .

. day of July, 2005:
Joseph Lee Nemelka
Attorney at Law
6806 South 1300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
Fax N o . 537-7661

$usan L. Bottoms
Legal Assistant to J. Bruce Reading
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Joseph Lee Nemelka - No. 6620
Attorney at Law
JOSEPH LEE NEMELKA, P C
6806 South 1300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
Telephone: (801) 568-0654
Facsimile: (801) 568-9196
Attorney for Petitioner

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KYNDA KAY RICHARDSON,

;

Petitioner,

]

vs.

)

KENNETH ANDREW RICHARDSON,
Respondent.

]
)
])

Case No. 034905249 DA

Judge Stephen L. Roth
Commissioner Susan Bradford

PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF COURT'S RULING

Petitioner, Kynda Kay Richardson, by and through her counsel, Joseph Lee Nemelka,
hereby submits this memorandum in opposition to Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration of
Court's Ruling, and Respondent's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, as
follows:

ARGUMENT
I.

The Alimony Award is Appropriate.
A.

The Ruling does not overestimate Respondent's Ability to Pay
Alimony

In his Memorandum Respondent argues that the Court erred by overestimating his ability
to pay alimony by "overstating [his] available income." Respondent asserts that the Court erred in
finding that he received a distribution from the State of Alaska of $1,984 per year instead of $919
per year. The Court did not err in this regard. Testimony at trial showed that the yearly Alaska
distribution varied anywhere from $500 to $2,000 per year. Even assuming arguendo that the
Court erred in overstating this amount by $1,000, the error is harmless. The monthly increase to
Respondent's income would be only $89 per month. This is not a substantial enough amount to
alter the Court's ruling.
Respondent also argues that the Court should not have imputed him income from his
scrapping activity. The Court did not err in this regard. Testimony at trial showed that
Respondent did additional scrapping work while he was working in the field. However, the
evidence also showed that Respondent has access to every job site and can still do the scrapping
work it from wherever he is regardless of his other administrative duties. Moreover, the Court
considered Respondent's reduction in income to be voluntary and that his scrapping work was
something that he had done historically during the marriage. For this reason, the Court thought it
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was fair to consider his previous scrapping activities which the Court specified as a previous
source of income. The Court did exactly what is allowable pursuant to Utah Case Law and that
is, when there is a reduction of income, just prior to or during a divorce action being filed, then it
is perfectly reasonable to use historical and other income for purposes of establishing income for
child support and alimony calculations. The Court specifically states its findings:
While there is no indication other than timing that Respondent took
the promotion in order to deliberately reduce his income for
purposes of this proceeding, this was in significant part a voluntary
decision on his part that reduced his income. For this reason, the
court believes that it is fair to consider his previous scrapping
activities (in which he made up to $1,000 per year from time to
time) as a source of income still open to him and to consider his
historical overtime. In all, the court believes that it is reasonable to
impute $1,700.00 per year a reasonable assessment of Kenneth's
additional earning capacity for purposes of child support and
alimony calculations, giving him some latitude to make changes in
his work position to accommodate reasonable work-related goals,
while recognizing that those changes are largely voluntary, as well
as taking into account his ability to make additional income, as he
has in the past, from scrapping or other work.
Furthermore, Respondent is trying to introduce evidence that was not introduced at trial.
Respondent is trying to "boot strap" additional argument into his Motion and Memorandum, and
such should be stricken.
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B.

The Court did not err in awarding Prospective Increases in Alimony,
nor did it err in Awarding Retroactive Alimony

Respondent argues that the Court improperly implemented retroactive alimony and
perspective increases of alimony as the child support payments decrease. Respondent points to
§30-3-5g(ii) of the Utah Code in arguing that the Court may not modify alimony to address needs
that did not exist at the entry of the Decree of Divorce. This argument is misplaced. At the time
of trial, Petitioner specifically testified, in open court and by exhibit, what her expenses where.
The Court found her expenses in the sum of $3,306.00 per month to be reasonable. The Court
found that Petitioner could only meet those expenses with both the alimony and child support
being paid to her. The Court found that with child support of $1,374, and with a net income of
$1,512, Petitioner would need alimony of $409 to meet her expenses. The Court found that as
the child support decreased, so would Petitioner's ability to pay her expenses, while Respondent's
ability to pay his expenses and alimony would increase. Petitioner's expenses would remain the
same and, therefore, any increase in prospective alimony is based upon "the needs of [Petitioner]"
that exist at the "time of entry of decree of divorce," or trial. The Court did not find that
Petitioner's expenses would be greater in the future and that she would therefore need more
alimony. The Court simply awarded alimony based upon the information before it as to
Petitioner's needs. This is a fact known and taken into consideration at trial.
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The Court made further specific findings for its reasoning to increase the alimony once the
child support payments went down. This was a very long-term marriage and as Respondent's
child support obligation went down as the children reached the age of eighteen (18), this would
not necessarily mean a change in the expenses for the children in Petitioner's custody. Further,
the Court wanted to maintain a rough equivalence of the parties standard of living after a longterm marriage. The Court recognized that as the children grow older the Respondent's income
will increase automatically, while Petitioner's expenses will not necessarily decrease.
Respondent's reliance on the Howell case is misplaced. The Court in Howell did state that
any future changes in alimony are limited to situations where a material change of circumstances
has occurred. The Howell Court did not elaborate on that statement and the facts of the Howell
case do not assist Respondent in this case. However, simply stating that the alimony will increase
incrementally, does not mean that this is a "future change" as contemplated by Howell This
Court has ruled what the alimony award would be now and as the minor children reach the age of
majority. Therefore, there will be no "future" changes in alimony. Of course, the Court's current
award of alimony would be changed but only if there is a substantial material change of
circumstances.
Respondent also argues that Howell mandates that the standard of living existing at or
near the time of trial is the appropriate bench mark. This is correct. The Court looked at the
standard of living of the parties and found Petitioner's expenses to be reasonable and her income,
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including child support, left a shortfall. The Court also found that Respondent had discretionary
income of $837 each and every month. Thus, the Court did consider the standard of living
existing at the time of trial and, therefore, did not err. The Court is not looking at the standard of
living that may occur in the future because the Court is assuming that the expenses and income of
the parties will remain the same. The Court is calculating and allowing an increase in the alimony
award as child support is decreased. It is fact that is known now, a fact that is forseeable and a
fact that is contemplated.
Contrary to Respondent's argument, future needs and future ability to pay are not being
prejudged by the Court. The Court's decision is not based upon speculation or conjecture. The
decision is based upon what the Court knows now in terms of the parties' incomes and expenses,
and the fact that the Court knows now that the child support will go down.
The Court could have very well found that alimony should be awarded in the sum of
$820.00. This is roughly what is available for alimony from Respondent's surplus. The Court
could very well say that the alimony award is $820.00 to be paid $420.00 now with an additional
$100.00 at each time. Regardless, the outcome is still the same. All of the issues are known. All
of the amounts are known and, therefore, there is nothing hindering the Court's order in making
the appropriate findings in that regard. Nothing of the Court's ruling violates the Howell nor
Utah Code § 30-3-5g(ii).
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Respondent repeats several times that the concept that future contingencies should not be
considered because there is no way of determining in advance the future needs and abilities of the
parties. Again, the Court is awarding alimony based upon the current ability to pay of the parties.
It is not relying on any determination of future income nor future expenses.
Respondent also argues that the award of alimony retroactive at the time of separation is
improper. This argument is also misplaced. During the separation of the parties, Respondent was
paying support each and every month to Petitioner. Such funds were not designated as child
support or alimony. Respondent argues that in order for any retroactive alimony to be awarded,
Petitioner had to bring a motion beforehand. However, when one party, such as Respondent in
this case, is already paying some amount of money for support, there is simply no need to file a
motion for an interim order. The Court in this matter is simply indicating that the $420.00 current
alimony award would be retroactive back to the date of the parties separation and any amounts
paid by Respondent during that time would be applied toward this obligation. Petitioner could
not, therefore, have waived her ability to interim alimony as it was already being paid, albeit in an
imprecise amount. Moreover, during this time the parties were negotiating to resolve the support
issues and all other issues of the divorce. Requiring the parties to litigate matters over which they
are trying to negotiate a resolution would be contrary to the sense of equity, justice and judicial
economy.
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C.

The Court Properly Considered Tithing as a Need of Petitioner

Respondent argues that the Court cannot consider tithing as an expense of the parties.
Respondent argues that tithing payments have nothing to do with a person's standard of living
and should not have been considered in the alimony award. This argument is incorrect and
somewhat disingenuous. The Court in its findings specifically indicates that the evidence that the
parties
historically made donations to the Church at about ten percent
(10%) of income and continue to do so, each listing such donations
as part of their expenses and the Court considers these donations as
a continuing part of their previous and present standards of living
and will include them as reasonable expenses for both parties.
Thus, the Court allowed both parties to claim tithing as an expense and part of their
standards of living. Both parties were treated equally in this regard, although allowing
Respondent to claim his alimony as an expense provides him an even greater monthly amount of
discretionary income: an additional $495. Respondent points to a number of cases that he asserts
support his position that the Court cannot consider tithing as part of a standard of living.
Respondent states that none of these cases authorizes a Court to consider alimony as an expense.
However, Respondent ignores the fact that no case law or statutory authority prohibits the Court
from considering tithing as a factor in determining an alimony award. In fact, the Court is
supposed to consider the "financial condition" of the parties. In Howell\ the Utah Court of
Appeals did define the standard of living as a "minimum of necessities, comforts or luxuries that is
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essential to maintaining a person in customary or proper status or circumstances." Howell does
not, however, further delineate what is meant by the foregoing language. Common sense dictates
that "customary" means what the parties were use to or the status quo. "Luxuries" would include
expenses that are not necessary for minimal survival, but for things such as vacations, golf lessons,
tanning, etc. Luxuries could also very easily include tithing or donations. If Respondent did not
believe that the Court should consider tithing or donations, why did he expect the Court to
consider his donations as an expense?
As Howell indicates, trial courts have considerable discretion in determining alimony in
divorce cases and such decisions will be held upon appeal unless a clear and prejudicial use of
discretion is demonstrated. No such abuse of discretion has been shown.
II.

Petitioner will not have sufficient income to pay her attorney's fees even if
retroactive alimony is permitted.

Respondent claims that retroactive alimony would be a windfall for Petitioner. This is not
accurate. During the time of the parties separation, Respondent has been living very frugally as
found by the Court. However, Respondent has been able to enjoy a greater standard of living
having the greater income of the parties. Furthermore, the retroactive alimony may or may not
amount to $10,500, given the fact that during the parties separation Respondent voluntarily paid
support for the minor children and for Petitioner. The only fact that remains is what amounts are
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still due and owing for retroactive child support and alimony. There are offsets which need to be
taken into consideration which can be included in any findings.
Respondent argues that the Affidavit of Attorneys Fees fails to meet the requirements for
Rule 73 of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. However, Respondent fails to recall that at trial that as
part of his exhibits, Petitioner included a detailed copy of each his attorneys fees which was
provided as an exhibit to the Court. Furthermore, Petitioner's counsel indicated to the Court the
amount of the hourly fee, the complexity of the case, and that he was requesting fees. This was
all made a part of record and placed with the Court as evidence. Besides, the purported Affidavit
as to Attorney's Fees has not even been filed with the Court. Petitioner's counsel will submit a
sufficiently detailed and formal affidavit with the final documents.
III.

The Findings do not Improperly Delegate Responsibility of Parent-time to

the Parties.
§ 30-3-35 of the Utah Code specifically indicates that any visitation or parent-time
established by the parties is preferred to a Court mandated award. Respondent requests that he be
awarded the minimum parent-time pursuant to § 30-3-35 of the Utah Code. However, that
statute contemplated both parents living within a reasonably close proximity. Respondent lives in
Alaska and Petitioner lives in Utah. Therefore, it is certainly impractical that Respondent have
parent-time one night a week and every other weekend.
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Respondent's argument that no proof was provided to show that less parent-time should
be awarded is inaccurate. The evidence showed, as the Court found, the level of abuse by
Respondent. The fact that some of the minor children are now in counseling and the fact of
Respondent's inability and unwillingness to visit the children for substantial periods of time, all
contribute to the reasoning and the findings of the Court in that regard. Evidence was placed on
the record that the children are still intimidated by their father. Furthermore, the Court did in fact
order that the applicable guidelines—§ 30-3-36 of the Utah Code—would be appropriate at some
point in the future after a gradual increase occurred. The Court ordered that the parties formulate
a reasonable parenting plan with the children's therapist, which should be in place before standard
parent-time occurs. It is hard to see how this can be an inappropriate award or an inappropriate
procedure for establishing Respondent's parent-time. The Court has given specific guidance to
the parties on how to deal with the issue. If the parties are unable to resolve any parenting issues,
they should be ordered to go to mediation to assist them in resolving those issues. This should
not, however, suspended the entry of the Decree of Divorce in this matter.
Respondent's statements that Petitioner has denied him parent-time since the trial is false,
and, once again, additional evidence he is trying to "boot strap" onto his Motion.
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CONCLUSION
Accordingly, pursuant to the foregoing, Petitioner requests that Respondent's Motion
for Reconsideration of Court ys Ruling be denied and that Respondent be responsible for
Petitioner's attorney's fees incurred in responding to the Motion.
DATED this / I r d a y of

JO'v

, 2005.

Nemelka
for Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum was mailed, U.S. First
Class Mail, postage prepaid, this / ? # day of JyA*\
, 2005, to:

u^

J. Bruce Reading
SCALLEY & READING, P C .
50 South Main, Suite 950
P.O. Box 11429
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0429
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KYNDA KAY RICHARDSON,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration and Objection to
Proposed Findings and Conclusions)

Petitioner,
vs.
KENNETH ANDREW RICHARDSON,

Case No. 034905249
Judge Stephen L. Roth

Respondent.

Respondent has filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Court's Ruling (the "Reconsideration
Motion"), supported by his Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration ("Respondent's
Memorandum"), asking the court to reconsider certain aspects of its ruling, set out in a Memorandum
Decision, after trial in this matter. Respondent also filed an Objection to Proposed Findings and
Decree, supported by the same Respondent's Memorandum. Petitioner filed a Memorandum in
Opposition to Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration of Court's Ruling ("Petitioner's
Opposition"). Respondent filed a Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration
and filed a Notice to Submit the matter for decision on October 5, 2005. Having considered the
parties' memoranda and reconsidered the evidence and arguments presented at trial, the court makes
the following decision.
DECISION
A.

THE ALIMONY AWARD.
Respondent asserts that the court's alimony award is improper because the court's assessment

of respondent's income overestimated his ability to pay, the provisions for increases in alimony
based on future reductions in child support and for retroactive alimony are contrary to law, and

tithing payments should not have been considered as a component of petitioner's needs. Each issue
is addressed below.
1.

Overestimate of Respondent's Income.

Respondent states that the court used an erroneous figure of $1984 as his 2004 annual
distribution from the State of Alaska, when his testimony was that the 2004 amount was $919, but
varied yearly. Respondent did not specify the level of variation, and the court believes that he would
have done so if it was to his advantage. The court recalls that petitioner testified that the distribution
was $1984 in 2004, that it had been about $2,000 in past years, but varied yearly. Apparently the
court misheard petitioner's testimony about the amount of the 2004 distribution, but generally found
petitioner's testimony to be credible. Accepting that the correct figure for 2004 was $919, however,
and taking into account petitioner's testimony about the level of distributions in past years of about
$2,000 but with annual variations, perhaps as low as $500, the court finds that a reasonable estimate
of respondent's income from state distributions is between $500 and $2000, with the average bearing
significantly toward the higher figure, or about $ 1,500. Taking into account this change, the court's
conclusion regarding respondent's income (as set out on page 3 of the Memorandum Decision), is
decreased by $484, from $65,484 per year to $65,000 per year, and consequently from $5,457 per
month to $5,417, a difference of $40 per month. This change is not significant, and does not affect
the court's conclusion in the Memorandum Decision about respondent's ability to pay alimony.
Respondent also states that the "scrapping" activity is no longer available to respondent,
because he did this while working in the field and he does not work in the field in his new
management job. In attributing $ 1,700 in additional income to respondent (Memorandum Decision
at 3), the court considered the fact that after the separation, respondent had voluntarily reduced his
income by taking a management job that did not allow him to benefit from the overtime that he had
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historically worked.1 The court does not believe that the testimony requires a conclusion that
respondent's previous scrapping activities are now foreclosed to him because of his new position.
In addition, the court considered these activities, undertaken during the marriage along with overtime
at work, as part of respondent's historical earning capacity that was appropriately taken into account
in light of his voluntary reduction in income.
The court therefore concludes that its ruling did not overestimate respondent's ability to pay
alimony.
2.

Future Increases in Alimony as Child Support Ends.

Respondent argues that the provision for future increases in alimony as the parties' children
turn eighteen and child support diminishes is contrary to law, because it is based on speculation
about the future needs and circumstances of the parties.
In Howell, the court noted that "Utah's appellate courts have considered the appropriateness
of alimony after a long term marriage, where the wife (usually) has worked primarily in the home,
has limited job skills, and is in her late forties or fifties." Howell, 806 P.2d at 1213 (citations
omitted). This is just such a case. The parties were married for over twenty years and had six
children. Petitioner gave up her ability to acquire significant work skills and earning capacity to care
for a large family, and continued to care for the remaining four minor children at the time of trial.
She is in her forties or fifties and is not likely to significantly increase her earning capacity to a point
where she can support herself at a standard the parties enjoyed during marriage. See Jones v. Jones,
700 P.2d 1072,1075 (Utah 1985), quoted in Howell, 806 P.2d at 1213. While an alimony award of
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While the court has concluded that respondent did not do this for the purpose of reducing
his income, the court believes that he did accept this position, which he had declined before, in part
because the parties' separation and pending divorce decreased his incentive to continue working in
a position that provided more income but was perhaps less attractive to him as a job.
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$420 per month at this point is appropriate to address petitioner's needs, it is based on petitioner's
present sources of income, including about $1,375 in child support, which will decrease
incrementally as each of the four minor children turns eighteen. The first of those turned eighteen
in May 2005 and the second will reach majority in 2006, with the other two following.
In holding that an alimony award of $ 1,800 was "clearly erroneous" (i.e., too low) the Howell
court took note of the problem that occurs in situations where predictable decreases in child support
are not taken into account in setting alimony awards:
Child support set pursuant to child support guidelines at $1363, plus alimony of
$1800, plus defendant's potential salary as determined by the court of $645, yields
gross monthly income of $3808 for defendant and her son. Plaintiff, after deducting
child support and alimony, has gross monthly income of $6,837. When his child
support obligation ceases, approximately fifteen months after the decree, he will have
gross monthly income of $8200 in comparison to defendant's $2445. Defendant fits
the profile described in Jones and other cases: she is approximately fifty years old,
has minimal marketable job skills, and has spent most of the thirty plus years of the
parties' marriage raising and caring for their five children and their home,
presumably with the concurrence of plaintiff. Her likelihood of achieving significant
salary levels in the future is slim. The alimony set by the court does not come close
to equalizing the parties' standard of living as of the time of the divorce, but allows
plaintiff a two to four times advantage.
Howell, 806 P.2d at 1213 (footnotes omitted). In a footnote at the end of the sentence describing the
disparity in the parties' income after child support ceases, the court quoted the statement of the Utah
Task Force on Gender and Justice Report to the Utah Judicial Council: "'If courts award child
support in lieu of permanent alimony, they may fail to anticipate the financial impact on the
remaining family as each child reached age 18 and his or her award terminates." Id. at 1213 n.2
(citation omitted).
While not as dramatically as in Howell, when the Richardsons' remaining minor children turn
eighteen, the relative disparity in the parties' incomes will increase significantly. Petitioner has gross
monthly income of about $3,622, including salary at $1,827, child support of $1,375 and $420 in
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alimony, from which she must provide for herself and four children. Respondent's gross monthly
income of $5,417, after deducting an equivalent amount of child support and alimony, is also
coincidentally about $3,622,2 from which he must provide for only himself. As his child support
obligation decreases, respondent's income will increase proportionately as petitioner's decreases.
At the end of his child support obligation, less than seven years from now, with no incremental
increases in alimony respondent will have gross monthly income of about $5,000 ($5,417 less $420)
in comparison to petitioner's $2,250 ($1,827 plus $420). With the addition to alimony of increments
totaling $400 at the end of child support, petitioner's income will be about $2,650 in comparison to
respondent's $4,600. The court believes that incremental increases in alimony as child support
decreases reflects the reality that petitioner will continue to incur expenses that will not be reduced
dollar-for-dollar as the children reach eighteen and, perhaps more importantly, roughly meets the
goal of "better equalizing] the parties' ability to go forward with their respective lives" after this
long-term marriage. See Howell, 806 P.2d at 1213.
The court therefore concludes that the incremental increases in alimony "anticipate the
financial impact on the remaining family as each child reach[es] age 18 and his or her award
terminates" and serve to equalize the parties' abilities to go on with their lives in a rough
approximation to the standard of living during the marriage, and therefore are not based on
speculation, but on circumstances "foreseeable at the time of the divorce" (see U.C.A. § 30-35(8)(g)(i)) and fall within the compass of Utah law.
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In its earlier Memorandum Decision, the court used net figures; these gross figures are used
simply for a rough comparison, similar to that made by the Court of Appeals in Howell.
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3.

Retroactive Award of Alimony.

Respondent argues, in effect, that the court's ruling that the alimony award should be
retroactive to the date of separation is contrary to the statutory scheme set out in U.C.A. § 30-3-3.
In support of this position, respondent cites an unpublished Court of Appeals decision, Osen v. Osen,
2000 UT App 90, which reasoned that an award of alimony meant to compensate for the appellant's
not having had to pay temporary support prior to trial, to the extent it purported to be "an award of
retroactive interim alimony," was "contrary to the intent of the statute," which allows a party to move
for interim alimony to meet the party's needs between separation and divorce." Id. at n.l, citing
U.C.A. § 30-3-3(3). The court noted that temporary support "was not intended to be awarded as an
afterthought in the final decree-especially when not requested by the benefitting party." Id., citing
U.C.A. § 30-3-3(4).
Petitioner counters that no temporary support award was sought or entered because
respondent was voluntarily paying some amount of support during the pendency of the suit that was
not denominated as either child support or maintenance and that, under the circumstances, she should
not be required to have sought a temporary support order as a prerequisite to obtaining a support
award that is retroactive. She argues that this would require the parties "to litigate matters over
which they are trying to negotiate a resolution" and would not be equitable or support judicial
economy.
Osen, as an unpublished decision, does not have the force of precedent, and its analysis of
the statute is cursory and amounts to dicta, because it was simply an aside contained in a footnote
that was not necessary to the result reached. The court believes that section 30-3-3 does not impose
the constraint on retroactive support awards that respondent asserts. "The precept is well recognized
that the trial court is vested with broad equitable powers in divorce matters." Curry v. Curry, 321

P.2d 939, 942 (Utah 1958). For example, in a related area these equitable powers have been found
by the Utah Court of Appeals, under applicable statutes and "Utah common law," to include "the
discretion to award modified alimony retroactively to the date a modification petition is served."
Wilde v. Wilde, 2001 UT App 318,1f 23. There is no evident reason why a court with statutory
authority to award temporary alimony during pending litigation and discretion to retroactively award
modified alimony would not also have discretion to make a retroactive award of temporary alimony
under its broad equitable powers. Spouses have common law and statutory duties to provide support
for dependent children and a dependent spouse. The statutory provision for temporary support orders
therefore appears to be a codification of a recognized obligation rather than the creation of a new
one. Recognizing this, it is not uncommon in this district for initial temporary support awards under
section 30-3-3 to be made retroactive to the date of filing of the petition or even to the date of
separation.
In addition, because of the inherently equitable nature of divorce proceedings, Utah courts
encourage non-litigative resolution of divorce issues through voluntary and mandatory mediation.
If retroactive temporary support was precluded by law where an order is not already in place to be
modified, parties who delayed formal litigation for temporary orders in order to reach resolution on
support issues through negotiation or mediation would be put at a significant disadvantage, and the
value and appeal of these less costly and less confrontational approaches would be reduced.
The issue then is whether in this context, the provisions of section 30-3-3 preclude the
retroactive award of support that does not amount to the modification of an existing order. Section
30-3-3 provides for an order of temporary support "during the pendency of the action" and for
amendment of "[ojrders entered under this section... during the course of the action or in the final
order or judgment." U.C.A. § 30-3-3(3) & (4). There is nothing in this language that plainly states

that the temporary award authorized here cannot be made retroactive. It simply provides that awards
already made can be modified. That the legislature knew how to restrict retroactive support awards
is clear from the language of U.C.A. § 78-45-9.3(3) & (4) (formerly part of U.C.A. § 30-3-10.6),
which provides clear limitations on the retroactive effect of modifications to existing awards. The
legislature apparently chose not to include such restrictions in section 30-3-3; rather, the language
of that section provides only that existing temporary orders are subject to modification. The court
concludes that it has discretion to award spousal support retroactively, particularly where the petition
requests such support, which is the case here. See Petition for Divorce, filed on August 26, 2003,
at!21.
Nevertheless, based on reconsideration of the evidence relating to the parties' pre-trial
circumstances, the court believes that the retroactive award of alimony should be modified to some
extent. The court finds from the evidence presented at trial that after the separation and petitioner's
move to Salt Lake City, respondent paid to her for some significant period of time up to $600 a week
in undifferentiated "support," apparently meant to include child support and spousal support. This
amount is substantially higher than the combined alimony and child support ordered by the court.
Once petitioner was served with the Petition for Divorce in September 2003, however, respondent
reduced his support payments to about $1,350, which he believed was the amount of child support
he would be required to pay, and which is very close to the amount required under Utah law.
Petitioner testified that her needs increased in May 2004, when her expenses increased, largely due
to taking on the costs of paying the mortgage on a house, compared with a lower monthly rental cost
before that, and associated increased utility expenses. But she also testified that she had been
significantly curtailing spending generally during that period because of her reduced circumstances
after respondent had substantially reduced his support payments after the Petition was filed, while
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respondent's circumstances did not require him to similarly economize. In setting the amount of
alimony, the court relied primarily on evidence about petitioner's financial condition and needs, and
her ability to meet those needs on her own, that appeared to be roughly similar from May 2004
forward, because that period seemed to more accurately reflect the standard of living before
separation.
Taking all this into consideration, together with the broader context of the parties' marriage,
the court believes it is equitable to make alimony retroactive to and including May 2004. The court
has considered the respondent's ability to pay support before trial, based on the court's analysis in
the original Memorandum Decision, which appears to be as pertinent to the period going back to
time of separation as to the time of trial. In addition, the court has considered the petitioner's needs,
as discussed above and in the Memorandum Decision, as well as the fact that respondent's pre-filing
support contributions were considerably larger than the court's combined child support and alimony
award, which acts to roughly offset any deficit petitioner may have experienced during the period
from filing up to May 2004.
The court further concludes that the higher amounts paid by respondent before filing are
sufficient to offset any slight deficiency in child support that may have accrued before trial.
Therefore child support need not be made retroactive.
The court's ruling set out in the Memorandum Decision is therefore modified to provide that
alimony is to be retroactive to and including May 2004 and child support is not to be retroactive, the
child support obligation having been complied with. Any overpayment of support obligations that
respondent may have made before filing was voluntary and has been taken into account in this
decision. Therefore, the court's ruling in the Memorandum Decision (at 5) that the respondent is "to

be credited for amounts paid since [the date of separation] against his obligations for child support
and alimony" is stricken.
4.

Consideration of Church Donations (Tithing).

Respondent argues that the court should not have considered the parties' contributions to
their church ("tithing") in determining the award of alimony "[b]ecause tithing payments, or other
charitable giving, have nothing to do with a person's standard of living . . . ." Respondent's
Memorandum at 4.
Utah courts have ruled that "the court should set alimony . . . to approximate the parties'
standard of living during the marriage as closely as possible. It follows that if the payor spouse's
resources are adequate, alimony need not be limited to provide for only basic needs, but should also
consider the recipient spouse's 'station in life.'" Howell v. Howell, 806P.2d 1209,1212 (Ut.Ct.App.
1991) (citations omitted). In this regard "'[standard of living is defined as 'a minimum of
necessities, comforts, or luxuries that is essential to maintaining a person in customary or proper
status or circumstances.'"3 Id. at 1211 (dictionary citation omitted).
As the court noted in the Memorandum Decision (at 9), during the marriage the parties
historically paid a contribution to their church of 10% of income. A regular tithing payment was
thus one of the "necessities, comforts, or luxuries" that was customary in their married life and a
component of their standard of living. It is appropriately considered as part of "the financial
condition and needs of the recipient spouse" in this case. See id. at 1212. In addition, both parties
indicated that they continued to pay tithing after separation. Given the disparity in the parties'

3

Because a purpose of alimony is "to approximate the standard of living enjoyed during the
marriage, to the extent possible", the "needs of the recipient spouse" are not limited to "only basic
needs" or the minimum necessary for subsistence, but also include "necessities, comforts, and
luxuries" enjoyed during the marriage. See Howell, 806 P.2d at 1212..
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income and petitioner's other established needs, if no allowance were made in the alimony
determination, she would likely be unable to pay tithing without sacrificing other legitimate needs.
Petitioner, on the other hand could afford to continue tithing payments without such sacrifice, and
is able to continue such payments at the level of alimony set by the court. If the court failed to
consider the parties' tithing payments as part of their standard of living, the alimony award would
fail to meet the goal of "'equalizing] the parties' respective post-divorce living standards

'" Id.

at 1211 (citation omitted; modification added).
The court therefore concludes that the parties' respective church contributions were
appropriately considered in determining alimony.
B.

RETROACTIVE ALIMONY and the AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES.
Respondent argues that if the retroactive alimony award stands, petitioner will receive a

windfall from which she should be required to pay her own attorney's fees. Alimony is an award
of spousal support based on need and is not a windfall to the recipient spouse. In this case, the court
has modified the alimony award to make it retroactive to May 2004, which appears to reduce the
amount of retroactive alimony to be paid by petitioner. Further, the court deducted attorney's fee
payments from petitioner's expenses in determining her needs for purposes of alimony, so there is
no overlap of retroactive alimony and payment for attorney's fees. Respondent's objection to the
award of attorney's fees on this basis is therefore not well taken.
Respondent also criticizes the completeness of the Affidavit of Attorney Fees submitted by
counsel for petitioner. While the Affidavit has not yet been filed, the court agrees that the Affidavit
should provide sufficient detail about the actual work performed for the court to determine whether
the fees requested were reasonable and necessary. Counsel should submit an appropriate affidavit,

incorporating the documentation submitted at trial, so the information regarding fees is readily
reviewable.
C.

PARENT TIME ISSUES.
Respondent criticizes the court's ruling regarding parent time, in particular the provision for

a gradual increase of respondent's parent time up to the level of statutory guidelines, while requiring
that he attend counseling. The court agrees that its parent-time ruling may not be workable. The
children are apparently not in therapy at this point, as the court believed; and other aspects of the
parent-time provisions are perhaps too open-ended.
The court believes its concerns, stated in the Memorandum Decision, can more realistically
be addressed by providing for parent-time per the applicable statutory guidelines, with respondent
required to successfully complete a parenting class that is functionally equivalent to the multi-week
parenting class provided by Valley Mental Health on court referral. Once respondent has done this,
parent-time should begin under the applicable statutory guidelines (probably section 30-3-37 because
of the respondent's residence in Alaska). The court's primary concern is that respondent complete
the course before the children are required to go to Alaska for parent-time. If respondent comes to
Utah to visit in the interim, he may have parent-time here without having first completed the class,
so long as he gives reasonable notice. Such parent-time should be at a minimum equivalent to that
provided for in U.C.A. § 30-3-35, i.e., one weekend, to begin with the weekend just after he arrives
or the weekend on which he arrives, and at least one weeknight, unless the parties otherwise agree.
Respondent should also be given liberal access to the children for telephone communication, at least
three times per week at a minimum, and for email, if available..
The parties should contact Valley Mental Health (attn: Kathy Reimherr (cell: 556-6037)) to
determine the nature of its parenting class, and respondent can complete that program or one in
-12-

Alaska that is roughly equivalent (for example a multi-week parenting class approved by the Alaska
counterpart of DCFS). No later than 30 days from the date of this Memorandum Decision,
respondent's counsel should provide petitioner's counsel with a description of the class he intends
to take. If the parties are in agreement that the proposed class meets the requirements of this
decision, respondent should complete the class as soon as reasonably possible; if in disagreement
they should approach the court for resolution, prepared to offer specific alternatives. As soon as
respondent has provided written verification that he has successfully completed the appropriate
parenting class, visitation under the statutory guidelines can begin, including travel to Alaska.
Before completion of the course, visitation will be limited to local visits in Utah, as explained above.
The Advisory Guidelines contained in U.C.A. § 30-3-33 shall apply, as appropriate to the parties'
circumstances.
The court therefore modifies its parent-time ruling to provide for parent-time as set forth
above.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby
ORDERED, as follows
1.

Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration and Objections to Proposed Findings and

Decree is granted in part and denied in part, as set forth above.
2.

The court's Memorandum Decision, dated June 2,2005, is accordingly supplemented

and modified as set forth above.
3.

Counsel for petitioner is to make appropriate modifications to the proposed findings

of fact and conclusions of law and the decree that take into account the court's ruling as set forth
herein.
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y of December, 2005.
DATED this Azd®.
BY THE COURT

Stephen L. Roth
DISTRICT JUDGE
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KYNDA KAY RICHARDSON,

]

Petitioner,

]
])

vs.
KENNETH ANDREW RICHARDSON,
Respondent.

Case No. 034905249 DA

]
) Judge Stephen L. Roth
]> Commissioner Susan Bradford

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The above-entitled matter came before the Honorable Stephen L. Roth of the aboveentitled Court on the 8th day of February, 2005. Petitioner appeared in person and was
represented by her counsel, Joseph Lee Nemelka. Respondent appeared in person and was
represented by his counsel, J. Bruce Reading. The Court, having heard argument of counsel and
testimony of the parties and witnesses, having reviewed the file in this matter, having taken the

matter under advisement, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, hereby finds as
follows:
1.

JURISDICTION AND GROUNDS: As a threshold matter, the court notes that

Petitioner has lived in Salt Lake County since January, 2003, after the separation of the parties in
about mid-2002, and therefore concludes that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject
matter of this case. Further, the parties have come to disagree deeply over crucial aspects of their
life together, perhaps most importantly over the approach to raising and disciplining their children.
While Respondent states that he does not desire a divorce, the parties had the benefit of
counseling before the filing of the Petition, have been separated for over two (2) years and have
established separate lives. The court concludes that there are grounds for entering a decree of
divorce based on the existence of irreconcilable differences that prevent the marriage from
continuing.
2.

CHILD CUSTODY AND SUPPORT: There were six children born to this

marriage, of whom four are still minors: Dana May Richardson, born May 17, 1987, Kyle Allen
Richardson, born July 19, 1988, Avery Keen Richardson, born August 21, 1990, and Justin
Wallace Richardson, born March 25, 1993. The parties do not contest child custody and appear
to be in agreement with Petitioner should have sole physical and legal custody. Petitioner was the
primary caretaker for the children prior to the parties' separation and the children continue to live
with her at their present home in West Valley City, Utah, while Kenneth has remained in Alaska,
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where the parties lived since their marriage in Anchorage on August 20, 1980. Petitioner appears
to strongly desire custody, and she has been and continues to be a fit parent. There is no
indication that the children have any different custody preference. The court concludes that
Petitioner is and has been a fit and proper parent, that there is not reason to disturb the parties'
own agreement with respect to custody.
3.

For purposes of the child support calculation, gross income includes income from

almost any source, other than those specifically excluded by the statute. See U.C. A., Section 7845-7.7(1). At the time of trial Respondent was working full time for Aurora Electric in
Anchorage as a project manager/estimator, earning a salary of $1,188.47 per week according to a
January 28, 2005, Employer Earnings Statement showing about $61,800.00 per year. Apparently
some time in 2003, after the parties' separation, Respondent was promoted to this supervisory
position from the journeyman electrician position that he had formerly held at Aurora Electric.
He received a lower salary in the prior position, but normally and consistently worked substantial
overtime (more than 40 hours per week) during the marriage and thus earned about $5,000.00
(2001 W-2) to $6,000.00 (2002 W-2) more each year than he does now, because as a supervisor,
overtime is no longer available to him. Respondent testified that he took the promotion because it
was a job change that he wanted and because his boss urged him to take the new position for the
benefit of the company. While there is no indication other than timing that Respondent took the
promotion in order to deliberately reduce his income for purposes of this proceeding, this was in
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significant part a voluntary decision on his part that reduced his income. For this reason, the
court believes that it is fair to consider his previous scrapping activities (in which he made up to
$1,000 per year from time to time) as a source of income still open to him and to consider his
historical overtime. In all, the court believes that it is reasonable to impute $1,700.00 per year a
reasonable assessment of Kenneth's additional earning capacity for purposes of child support and
alimony calculations, giving him some latitude to make changes in his work position to
accommodate reasonable work-related goals, while recognizing that those changes are largely
voluntary, as well as taking into account his ability to make additional income, as he has in the
past, from scrapping or other work.
4.

In addition, Respondent receives an annual distribution made to all citizens of the

State of Alaska. The most recent such distribution was $919, and Respondent testified that it was
sometimes less and sometimes more. The court finds that a reasonable estimate of Respondent's
income from state distributions is between $500 and $2,000, with the average bearing significantly
toward the higher figure, or about $1,500. This annual payment falls within the broad scope of
gross income under the statute, and the court concludes that the $1,500.00 figure is a reasonable
estimate of ongoing income from this source for purposes of calculating gross income (for child
support and alimony). Respondent's gross income for child support purposes is therefore
$61,800.00 plus $1,700.00 plus $1,500; a total of $65,000 per year, or $5,417.00 per month.
5.

Petitioner is employed by the State of Utah, working full time. Her last pay stub
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for 2004 showed her annual salary to be $21,927.00 or $1,827.00 per month. Petitioner's work
experience is relatively minimal because of the parties' decisions regarding how their family would
function during the marriage. After about a year of employment, Petitioner cared for the children
at home during the marriage, with only short periods of part time employment, and she does not
appear to have developed any specialized job skills. There was no evidence that she had either the
opportunity or the capacity to earn more than what she is making now; and the court concludes
that she is fully employed in her present position at the present rate of pay, which is her gross
income.
6.

There is no evidence that either party was obligated to any other person for

alimony or child support outside the bounds of this case, and therefore gross income and adjusted
gross income are the same for each party. These figures are therefore to be used for calculating
the share of child support attributable to each party, with Respondent to be the obligated party.
7.

Based upon the foregoing, Respondent shall pay child support to Petitioner in the

sum of $1,374 per month commencing as of the date of trial herein.
8.

Respondent's obligation to pay child support shall continue as to each minor child

until that minor child reaches the age of eighteen (18) or graduates from high school, whichever
later occurs.
9.

Pursuant to Utah Code §62A-11-401 et seq and -501, withholding of child support

from Respondent's wages as a means of collecting child support shall be authorized.
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10.

INCOME TAX EXEMPTIONS: The parties propose that they should each be

allocated tax deductions for two children, but disagree on which. No real basis for allocation was
presented other than the representation that Petitioner needed at least one child deduction as
follows: Dana and Justin to Petitioner and Kyle and Avery to Respondent. When Dana reaches
eighteen (18), the exemptions should alternate to equalize the benefits as much as possible, with
Respondent having the deductions for two children and Petitioner for one the first year in which
there are only three deductions available, Petitioner having two and Respondent one in the second
year, and so on. When the deductions for children reduce to two, each parent may claim one
deduction; when there is only one deduction left, that deduction goes to Petitioner. In the
alternative, for any tax year the party for whom the exemption(s) is most valuable may elect to
purchase the option(s) from the other party for the amount the other party would lost if the
exemption were not available.
11.

MEDICAL INSURANCE & EXPENSES: Each party shall provide medical

insurance for the minor children as long as it remains available at a reasonable cost through his or
her employment. If Respondent secures insurance, Respondent shall provide evidence of said
coverage and that such coverage is effective in Utah.
a.

Each parent shall share equally the out-of-pocket costs of the premium

actually paid by a parent for the children's portion of insurance. The children's portion of the
premium is a per capita share of the premium actually paid. The premium expense for the children
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shall be calculated by dividing the premium amount by the number of persons covered under the
policy and multiplying the result by the number of children in the instant case.
b.

Each parent shall pay one-half QA) of all reasonable and necessary

uninsured medical expenses, including deductibles and co-payments, incurred for the dependent
children.
c.

The parent ordered to maintain insurance shall provide verification of

coverage to the other parent, or to the Office of Recovery Services under Title IV of the Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 601 et seq., upon initial enrollment of the dependent children,
and thereafter on or before January 2 of each calendar year. The parent shall notify the other
parent, or the Office of Recovery Services of any change of insurance carrier, premium, or
benefits within 30 calendar days of the date he/she knew or should have known of the change.
d.

The parent who incurs medical expenses shall provide written verification

of the cost and payment of medical expenses to the other parent within thirty (30) days of
payment.
e.

In addition to any other sanctions provided by the Court, a parent

incurring medical expenses may be denied the right to receive credit for the expenses or to
recover the other parent's share of the expenses if that parent fails to comply with above.
12.

PERSONAL PROPERTY: The evidence at trial indicated disagreement over the
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value and division of the certain personal property acquired during the marriage. This involved
essentially a savings account containing about $1,000.00, a certificate of deposit in the amount of
approximately $6,000.00, a set of firearms collected by Respondent, tools, certain items of
apparel made of animal fur, a Bobcat tractor, and three vehicles: a van in Petitioner's possession
and two trucks (a 1981 Dodge Dakota and a 2003 Ford Ranger) in Respondent's possession.
The parties agreed at the end of the trial that Petitioner receive the savings account, the certificate
of deposit and the van and that Respondent be awarded the two trucks, the tools, the firearm
collection, the Bobcat tractor, and the fur items. The court has no reason to believe that this
division is not fair and equitable and therefore concludes that it is.
13.

There is also a New York Life Insurance Policy on Respondent's life with a

$50,000.00 face amount and a cash value of about $6,300.00. Respondent proposed that the
policy be cashed out and the proceeds be share equally between the parties. It was not clear to
the court what Petitioner wanted in this regard. It appears to the court that it would be of some
value to the parties and in the children's interest to keep the insurance policy in place, with
Respondent to pay the premiums, having the minor children irrevocably designated as the
beneficiaries and Petitioner as Trustee for the minor children. Once the last child is emancipated,
the policy is to cashed in, with Petitioner to receive within sixty (60) days thereafter one-half QA)
of the cash value of the policy, valued as of the time of trial. The parties have the option, if they
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both agree to do so, of cashing the policy in now, with the amount received in payment to be
divided equally between them.
14.

Further, Respondent has a 401(k) that shall be divided equally and a Qualified

Domestic Relations Order shall be prepared, if necessary. Any loans taken out by Respondent
since the parties separation shall be added to the balance of the 401(k) prior to division.
Respondent shall provide a copy of his most recent statement showing the current balance and
loan balance of the 401 (k).
15.

REAL PROPERTY: There are two (2) parcels of real property at issue, the

marital home in Eagle River, Alaska, near Anchorage, and an unimproved, .92 acre lot located in
a subdivision in Willow, Alaska. Neither property is encumbered by a mortgage or other
significant lien. The parties agree that the equity of each property should be divided between
them, but they disagree about the value of each property. Petitioner believed the Willow lot to be
worth about $10,000.00, based on unspecified calls to real estate agents in the area. Respondent
estimated the lot to be worth $3,000.00 to $4,000.00 and said that it had an assessment value on
the tax notice of $4,200.00. The court believes that an estimated value of $5,000.00 is reasonable
approximation of the value of the lot, given the sparse information presented. Petitioner is to
receive $2,500.00 as her share of the Willow lot's value.
16.

The Eagle River home was purchased about twenty (20) years ago for about
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$50,000.00. It was appraised in early 2004 at $60,000.00. Respondent says the appraisal is
incorrect because it indicates that the house, a modular house, has sanitary sewer, asphalt street,
curb and gutter, which it does not have. He believes it is worth $47,000.00 based on a tax
assessment and on his estimate that it will take about $13,000.00 to connect the house to
municipal sewer, a step he says is necessary to make the house saleable. Petitioner says she
believes the appraisal is correct, even without a sewer hook-up, and that the house cannot have
depreciated in value since it was purchased. The appraisal indicates that property values in the
area are increasing, and no evidence was presented on how property tax assessments were made.
Respondent has presented no reliable evidence of the effect on property value of the lack of sewer
hook-up, much less that the value would be directly related to the cost of providing such an
improvement. Nor has he presented any evidence of how property tax assessments are made in
the area or how reliable an indication of actual value they are or that property values have
decreased since the purchase of the property for $50,000.00 over twenty (20) years ago. The
court believes that the appraisal is the most reliable indication of value under the circumstances
and finds that the house is worth $60,000.00 at the time of trial and the equity should be divided
equally, with the house to be sold and the net proceeds split equally between the parties. In the
alternative, if Respondent wants to keep the house, he must pay $30,000.00 to Petitioner.
17.

ALIMONY: "[T]he purpose of alimony is to prevent the receiving spouse from
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becoming a public charge and to maintain the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage to
the extent possible." Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Ut. Ct. App. 1991), citing Fletcher v
Fletcher, 615 P.2nd 1218, 1223 (Utah 1980). The Supreme Court, in Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d
1072 (Utah 1985), set out "three factors that must be considered in fixing a reasonable alimony
award: [1] the financial conditions and needs of the wife; [2] the ability of the wife to produce a
sufficient income for herself; and [3] the ability of the husband to provide support." Id At 1075
(edits by the court; citations omitted); U.C.A., Sect. 30-3-5(8) (which expands the number of
factors to be considered, while retaining the Jones factors as an essence of the inquiry.) After the
determination of the needs and resources of both parties using the Jones factors, "the court should
set alimony as permitted by those parameters, to approximate the parties' standard of living
during the marriage as closely as possible." Howell, 806 P.2d at 1212. In the case of a long-term
marriage, the alimony award "should, cto the extent possible, equalize the parties' respective
standards of living and maintain them at a level as close as possible to the standard of living
enjoyed during the marriage.'" Id, quoting Gardner v Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1081 (Utah
1988) cf Howell, 806 P.2nd at 1216 n.4 ("The alimony award, however, need not be large
enough to maintain the receiving spouse at the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage if
that amount of alimony would lower the standard of living of the paying spouse below that of the
receiving spouse.") . Having considered "all relevant facts and equitable principles," the court
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"may, in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time of trial."
U.C.A., Section 30-3-5(8)(c).
18.

Petitioner's income, as discussed above, is $1,827.00 per month. Accepting the

annual deductions from her salary as set out in her 2004 year-end pay stub, they are Federal Tax
($465.10), Social Security Tax ($1,286.53), Medicare Tax ($300,88), State Tax $551.73), and
health, dental and vision insurance (together $1,176.52), for a total monthly deduction of about
$315.00. Her net income for alimony purposes is therefore $1,512.00. (The court is not
considering deductions for life insurance for either party because essentially voluntary (on the part
of Petitioner) or building cash value from this point forward (on the part of Respondent)). Child
support payments will be approximately $1,375.00 per month. Total net income, without
consideration of alimony tax consequences, is therefore about $2,897.00.
19.

As to general expense deductions, the court believes that Petitioner's monthly

expenses, as set forth in Exhibit 7, are reasonable, especially considering that she is caring for four
(4) children. Neither party presented much evidence of their standard of living at the time of
separation, so the court is relying primarily on evidence regarding their expenses as a fair
substitute or approximation. While she filed a financial declaration earlier that stated lower
expenses, the court found credible her explanation that she had been keeping expenses
deliberately low during that period because of the financial uncertainties of the unresolved divorce
and had increased her expenses to a more normal level during 2004, the subject period for Exhibit
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7. Those deductions are supported by detailed monthly expense reports. Nevertheless, Exhibit 7
contains more expenses that the court considers as either one-time costs or not allowable for
purposes of alimony determination. Those include attorneys fees and mediation costs related to
the divorce in the amount of $1,331.00. They also include $1,779.00 in what appears to be a onetime cost for the purchase of appliances ($906.10 to Maytag on January 26 and $873.05 to
Maytag on February 7), although the court believes that one-half that amount (about ($890.00) is
a reasonable annual budget for general maintenance of a home and its contents over a the long
term, given the number of children in her care and the need to furnish a separate house, and ought
to be included as an expense. Because the testimony indicated that the parties historically have
made donations to their church at about ten percent (10%) of income and continue to do so, each
listing such donations as part of their expenses, the court considers these donations as a
continuing part of their previous and present standard of living and will include them as
reasonable expenses for both parties. Deducting $185.00 per month for one-time expenses,
Petitioner's reasonable expenses are $3,306.00 per month. The deficit between her income,
including initial child support, and her reasonable expenses is therefore about $409.00 per month.
20.

Respondent's income, as discussed above, is $5,417.00 per month. This amounts

to salary of $61,800.00 per year, plus $1,500.00 state payment and $1,700.00 additional
attributed income, per the analysis set forth above. Deductions, per Respondent's weekly Direct
Deposit Earnings Statement, including Medicaid $16.94), Social Security ($72.45), Federal Tax
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$117.85), local tax $5.40) and health insurance $10.25). The court is not considering deductions
for 401k contributions, a medical flex plan and a 401k loan repayment. The loan payment
deduction (amounting to about $193.00 per month) is to pay off a $10,000.00 loan Respondent
took out of his retirement plan in 2003, after the separation, to pay attorneys fees $5,000.00, a
down payment on a new truck ($3,000.00), and a deposit in a savings account $2,000.00). The
court does not believe the repayment on this loan, given its timing and the use of the proceeds,
ought to be counted as a deduction from salary for alimony purposes. Other deductions appear
reasonable. Similarly, the medical flex plan is a voluntary contribution (about $10.00 per week)
that can be used to pay medical expenses as they arise (apparently deductibles and other expenses
not covered by insurance). Because this is essentially a medical savings plan for the benefit of the
Respondent, it should not be counted as a true deduction for alimony purposes.
21.

The total weekly deductions from salary are therefore about $223.00 or about

$966.00 per month. Including an additional $26.00 per month to account for a proportional
amount of deductions for the imputed $1,700.00 per year (there was no evidence that the state
payment of $1,982.00 per year was taxed), the total deductions are about $992.00 per month,
leaving a net income, before any alimony tax benefits of $4,465.00. There was no evidence of the
effect of alimony payments on Respondent's tax liability or alimony receipt on Petitioner's, but
the court does not believe that tax considerations related to alimony would substantially alter the
conclusions reached herein.
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22.

Some expenses the court believes should not be included. As discussed above, the

court does not believe that the expenses for repayment of the 401k loan (about $193.00 per
month) and life insurance (which the court estimates at $65.00 per moth based on the absence of
any other evidence other than Respondent's claim to have $165.00 in monthly expenses for all
insurance other than deducted health insurance premiums) should be included for purposes of
alimony determination, as they are not necessities, and neither party urged their inclusion. In
addition, Respondent claims a total of $350.00 per month in medical and dental expenses. There
was no evidence of a need for health care that would support expenses at that level, especially
since he apparently has employer-provided health insurance for which amounts are deducted from
his salary; and absent any evidence of particular health conditions requiring treatment, the court
believes that $50.00 per month is reasonable. Respondent's reasonable expenses are therefore
about $3,628.00.
23.

Respondent therefore has a surplus of net income over expenses of about $837.00

per month. The court notes that, while both the parties and the court have used figures for
income and expenses that appear quite specific, these figures in reality are approximations,
especially as they are meant to ultimately represent amounts received and spent in the future. In
determining alimony, the court recognizes and takes into account the imprecision of the amounts
involved.
24.

Other than the equity in the marital home, the parties have accumulated little in the
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way of resources to supplement their incomes. Considering Petitioner's financial condition and
needs and her inability to provide sufficient income to meet those needs, together with
Respondent's ability to provide support and the significant income differential between them even
taking into account the payment and receipt of child support, the court concludes that Respondent
shall pay alimony to Petitioner. In addition, the court believes it is significant that this is a long
term marriage in which Petitioner gave up her ability to improve her skills and earning capacity to
care for a large family, so that should play a part in the determination of alimony amounts, as well.
See Howell, 806 P.2d at 1213. The court believes that alimony in the amount of $420.00 is a fair
and reasonable award. This sum approximates the Petitioner's need, before consideration of the
alimony tax consequences, and falls within Respondent's capacity to pay, as determined by the
court.
25.

While a significant amount of her expenses can now be attributed to minor children

in the home, a good part of the income needed by Petitioner to maintain the appropriate standard
of living is also attributable to child support payments from Respondent. As children reach the
age of eighteen (18), which will be a regular occurrence over the next few years, the court
believes that Petitioner's income will be reduced disproportionately to the reduction of expenses
both because the reasonable expenses associated for a time even with older children will not
necessarily diminish to zero as they reach eighteen (18) years old and because expenses, such as
mortgage, utilities and so on will not necessarily be significantly or proportionately reduce even
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when children do leave the home. For that reason, the court concludes that it is reasonable to
increase alimony to some extent as Petitioner's income from child support payments goes down
and as Respondent's expenses from such payments also diminish. This also contributes to the
goal of maintaining a rough equivalence in the parties' standard of living after a long-term
marriage. Id. (considering the effects of diminishing child support obligations as children reach
eighteen (18) on the relative disparity of income between spouses). The alimony payments due to
Petitioner should therefore increase by $100.00 per month, beginning the first day of the month
after which each child turns eighteen (18). On this basis, when the last child turns eighteen (18),
Respondent's income will have increase by about $1,375.00 per month, while commensurate
alimony increases to Petitioner will amount to $400.00 per month, leaving him with some cushion
that takes into account the purported increased costs of living in Alaska and not reducing his
standard of living below Petitioner's.
26.

Alimony should continue for a period equal to the length of the marriage. Changes

in income due to retirement at a reasonable age are not taken into account here and may be
considered as changes of circumstances in the future, if otherwise appropriate. Alimony should be
paid retroactive to and including May, 2004.
27.

PARENT-TIME: While it is apparent that Respondent loves his children, during

the marriage he took a decidedly harsher approach to their discipline than did Petitioner, going to
the extreme of punishing them by the use of a belt on occasion and threatening to do so more
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regularly. The court believes that this goes beyond acceptable limits on discipline of children and
it apparently played a part in the break up of the marriage. The children remain somewhat
intimidated by their father, and their distance from him, both emotional and geographical at this
point, has been exacerbated by his decision that it would be best under the circumstances of the
separation to contact them infrequently. While his telephone contacts have recently increased, he
has seen the children only a few times since the separation. Some or all of the children have been
in counseling to deal in part with issues involving their father.
28.

It is in the best interest of the children to reestablish their relationship with their

father as soon as possible and that his access to them be as liberal as the distances involved allow,
at a minimum in accordance with the applicable guidelines for parent time. Under the
circumstances, Respondent shall successfully complete a parenting class that is functionally
equivalent to the multi-week parenting class provided by Valley Mental Health on court referral.
Further, such course shall administered by an agency approved by the State of .Alaska, such as the
Men & Women's Center or the Recovery Connection. Once Respondent has done this, parenttime should begin pursuant to §30-3-37 of the Utah Code. The court's primary concern is that
Respondent complete the parenting course before the children are required to go to Alaska for
parent-time. If Respondent travels to Utah in the interim, even without first having completed the
class, and upon reasonable notice, he should be allowed minimum parent-time pursuant to §30-335 of the Utah Code or as the parties may agree. Respondent should also be given liberal
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telephone access to the children at a minimum three (3) times per week, plus e-mail
communication if available. The parties should contact Valley Mental Health (Kathy Reimherr556-6037) to determine the nature of its parenting class, and Respondent can complete that
program or one in Alaska that is roughly equivalent (for example, a multi-week parenting class
approved by the Alaska counterpart to Division of Child and Family Services). No later than
thirty (30) days from December 23, 2005, Respondent's counsel shall provide Petitioner's counsel
with a description of the class he intends to take. If the parties are in agreement that the proposed
class meets the requirements of the court, Respondent should complete the class as soon as
reasonably possible. If the parties are in disagreement, they should approach the court for a
resolution, but prepare to offer specific alternatives. As soon as Respondent has provided written
verification that he has successfully completed the appropriate parenting class, his parent-time as
set forth above can begin, including travel to Alaska. All applicable provisions of the advisory
guidelines set forth in §303-33 of the Utah Code shall be adopted herein.
29.

Petitioner is ordered to pay the transportation costs of one (1) visit per year,

provided that (a) there is not only one (1) visit, and (b) arrangements are made at least thirty (30)
days in advance. If there is only one (1) visit per year, Petitioner shall be responsible for only onehalf QA) of the transportation costs for that visit.
30.

ATTORNEY'S FEES: Based on the Court's assessment that Petitioner's
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expenses are beyond her income and other resources at this point and on its conclusions that
Respondent's resources provide him with a surplus over his expenses (as discussed in connection
with alimony, above), the court concludes that Respondent should be responsible to pay
Petitioner's reasonable attorney's fees incurred in this matter Petitioner has insufficient income
to meet her needs, and alimony payments will bring her income up to the point where her needs
are met, not including attorney's fees Respondent will have a level of surplus and is more able to
pay fees Petitioner should provide evidence of the amount and reasonableness of the fees she
claims to the Court
31.

NAME CHANGE:

Petitioner shall be restored to her maiden name if desired

From the foregoing findings of facts, the Court now makes and enters ils
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That the bonds of matrimony hereto and now existing between Petitioner and

Respondent shall be dissolved and Petitioner shall be granted decree of divorce from Respondent,
the same to become absolute and final upon the signing of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and the Decree of Divorce and the filing of the same with the Clerk of the above-entitled Court
2.

That all matters and issues including, but not limited to, child custody, parent-time,

child support, alimony, division of property and debts, and attorney fees shall be ordered pursuant
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to the foregoing Findings of Fact.
DATED this
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KYNDA KAY RICHARDSON,

]

Petitioner,

]

vs.
KENNETH ANDREW RICHARDSON,
Respondent.

])

Case No. 034905249 DA

]
)
))

Judge Stephen L. Roth
Commissioner Susan Bradford

DECREE OF DIVORCE

The above-entitled matter came before the Honorable Stephen L. Roth of the aboveentitled Court on the 8th day of February, 2005. Petitioner appeared in person and was
represented by her counsel, Joseph Lee Nemelka. Respondent appeared in person and was
represented by his counsel, J. Bruce Reading. The Court, having heard argument of counsel and
testimony of the parties and witnesses, having reviewed the file in this matter, having taken the
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matter under advisement, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, and having heretofore
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and good cause appearing therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREE AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Petitioner is awarded a divorce from Respondent based on the existence of

irreconcilable differences that prevent the marriage from continuing.
2.

CHILD CUSTODY AND SUPPORT: There were six children born to this

marriage, of whom four are still minors: Dana May Richardson, born May 17, 1987, Kyte Allen
Richardson, born July 19, 1988, Avery Keen Richardson, born August 21, 1990, and Justin
Wallace Richardson, born March 25, 1993. Petitioner is awarded sole physical and legal custody
of the minor children.
3.

Respondent shall pay child support to Petitioner in the sum of $1,374 per month

commencing as of the date of trial herein.
4.

Respondent's obligation to pay child support shall continue as to each minor child

until that minor child reaches the age of eighteen (18) or graduates from high school, whichever
later occurs.
5.

Pursuant to Utah Code §62A-11-401 et seq and -501, withholding of child support

from Respondent's wages as a means of collecting child support shall be authorized.
6.

INCOME TAX EXEMPTIONS: Petitioner shall be awarded the minor children
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Dana and Justin as dependants for tax exemption purposes and Respondent shall be awarded the
minor children Kyle and Avery. When Dana reaches eighteen (18), the exemptions should
alternate to equalize the benefits as much as possible, with Respondent having the deductions for
two children and Petitioner for one the first year in which there are only three deductions
available, Petitioner having two and Respondent one in the second year, and so on. When the
deductions for children reduce to two, each parent may claim one deduction; when there is only
one deduction left, that deduction goes to Petitioner. In the alternative, for any tax year the party
for whom the exemption(s) is most valuable may elect to purchase the option(s) from the other
party for the amount the other party would lost if the exemption were not available. The parties
shall exchange tax information by March 1st of each year. In any event, Respondent's ability to
claim any minor child(ren) is conditioned upon his being current in his child support and medical
expense obligations.
7.

MEDICAL INSURANCE & EXPENSES: Each party shall provide medical

insurance for the minor children as long as it remains available at a reasonable cost through his or
her employment. If Respondent secures insurance, Respondent shall provide evidence of said
coverage and that such coverage is effective in Utah.
a.

Each parent shall share equally the out-of-pocket costs of the premium

actually paid by a parent for the children's portion of insurance. The children's portion of the
premium is a per capita share of the premium actually paid. The premium expense for the children
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shall be calculated by dividing the premium amount by the number of persons covered under the
policy and multiplying the result by the number of children in the instant case.
b.

Each parent shall pay one-half (Vi) of all reasonable and necessary

uninsured medical expenses, including deductibles and co-payments, incurred for the dependent
children.
c.

The parent ordered to maintain insurance shall provide verification of

coverage to the other parent, or to the Office of Recovery Services under Title IV of the Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 601 et seq., upon initial enrollment of the dependent children,
and thereafter on or before January 2 of each calendar year. The parent shall notify the other
parent, or the Office of Recovery Services of any change of insurance carrier, premium, or
benefits within 30 calendar days of the date he/she knew or should have known of the change.
d.

The parent who incurs medical expenses shall provide written verification

of the cost and payment of medical expenses to the other parent within thirty (30) days of
payment.
e.

In addition to any other sanctions provided by the Court, a parent

incurring medical expenses may be denied the right to receive credit for the expenses or to
recover the other parent's share of the expenses if that parent fails to comply with above.
8.

PERSONAL PROPERTY: During the marriage the parties acquired certain
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items of personal property including a savings account containing about $1,000.00, a certificate of
deposit in the amount of approximately $6,000.00, a set of firearms collected by Respondent,
tools, certain items of apparel made of animal fur, a Bobcat tractor, and three vehicles: a van in
Petitioner's possession and two trucks (a 1981 Dodge Dakota and a 2003 Ford Ranger) in
Respondent's possession. Petitioner shall be awarded the savings account, the certificate of
deposit and the van and Respondent shall be awarded the two trucks, the tools, the firearm
collection, the Bobcat tractor, and the fur items.
9.

There is also a New York Life Insurance Policy on Respondent's life with a

$50,000.00 face amount and a cash value of about $6,300.00. It is in minor children's interest to
keep the insurance policy in place, with Respondent to pay the premiums, having the minor
children irrevocably designated as the beneficiaries and Petitioner as Trustee for the minor
children. Once the last child is emancipated, the policy is to cashed in, with Petitioner to receive
within sixty (60) days thereafter one-half Q/i) of the cash value of the policy, valued as of the time
of trial. The parties have the option, if they both agree to do so, of cashing the policy in now,
with the amount received in payment to be divided equally between them.
10.

Further, Respondent has a 401(k) that shall be divided equally and a Qualified

Domestic Relations Order shall be prepared, if necessary. Any loans taken out by Respondent
since the parties separation shall be added to the balance of the 401(k) prior to division.
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Respondent shall provide a copy of his most recent statement showing the current balance and
loan balance of the 401(k).
11.

REAL PROPERTY: During the marriage the parties acquired two (2) parcels of

real property: the marital home in Eagle River, Alaska, near Anchorage, and an unimproved, .92
acre lot located in a subdivision in Willow, Alaska. Neither property is encumbered by a
mortgage or other significant lien. Respondent shall be awarded the Willow lot, but shall pay to
Petitioner the sum of $2,500.00 as her share of the Willow lot's value.
12.

The Eagle River residence shall be sold and the proceeds shall be split equally

between the parties. However, if Respondent wants to keep the house, he must pay $30,000.00
to Petitioner.
13.

ALIMONY: Petitioner is awarded the sum of $420.00 per month in alimony

from Respondent. The alimony payment due to Petitioner shall increase by $100.00 per month,
beginning the first day of the month after which each child turns eighteen (18). On this basis,
when the last child turns eighteen (18), the alimony increases to Petitioner will amount to an
additional $400.00 per month.
14.

Alimony shall continue for a period equal to the length of the marriage. Changes

in income due to retirement at a reasonable age are not taken into account here and may be
considered as changes of circumstances in the future, if otherwise appropriate. Alimony shall also
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be paid retroactive to and including May, 2004. Said alimony obligation shall be automatically
withheld by the Office of Recovery Services.
15.

PARENT-TIME: Respondent shall successfully complete a parenting class that is

functionally equivalent to the multi-week parenting class provided by Valley Mental Health on
court referral. Further, such course shall administered by an agency approved by the State of
Alaska, such as the Men & Women's Center or the Recovery Connection. Once Respondent has
done this, parent-time shall begin pursuant to §30-3-37 of the Utah Code. Respondent must
complete the parenting course before the children are required to go to Alaska for parent-time. If
Respondent travels to Utah in the interim, even without first having completed the class, and upon
reasonable notice, he shall be allowed minimum parent-time pursuant to §30-3-35 of the Utah
Code, or as the parties may agree. Respondent shall also be given liberal telephone access to the
children at a minimum three (3) times per week, plus e-mail communication if available. The
parties shall contact Valley Mental Health (Kathy Reimherr-556-6037) to determine the nature of
its parenting class, and Respondent can complete that program or one in Alaska that is roughly
equivalent (for example, a multi-week parenting class approved by the Alaska counterpart to
Division of Child and Family Services). No later than thirty (30) days from December 23, 2005,
Respondent's counsel shall provide Petitioner's counsel with a description of the class he intends
to take. If the parties are in agreement that the proposed class meets the requirements of the
court, Respondent shall complete the class as soon as reasonably possible. If the parties are in
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disagreement, they shall approach the court for a resolution, but prepare to offer specific
alternatives. As soon as Respondent has provided written verification that he has successfully
completed the appropriate parenting class, his parent-time as set forth above can begin, including
travel to Alaska. All applicable provisions of the advisory guidelines set forth in §303-33 of the
Utah Code shall be adopted herein.
16.

Petitioner is ordered to pay the transportation costs of one (1) visit per year,

provided that (a) there is not only one (1) visit, and (b) arrangements are made at least thirty (30)
days in advance. If there is only one (1) visit per year, Petitioner shall be responsible for only onehalf Q/2) of the transportation costs for that visit.
17.

ATTORNEY'S FEES: Respondent shall be responsible to pay Petitioner's

reasonable attorney's fees incurred in this matter in the sum of $4,488.00.
18.

NAME CHANGE:

DATED this /{/Slav of

Petitioner shall be restored to her maiden name if desired.
/l/^rf

f^

, 2006.

73 W
IONORABLE STEPHEN L.JL- ^
THIRD D I S T R I C T ^ O M T JfA-K*'^'
V

•*

/

t^.'

:

^M.'j

***&*££?

